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Chapter 2
Studying Rulers and States across Fifteenth-
Century Western Eurasia
Jan Dumolyn and Jo Van Steenbergen
In this second chapter we seek to embed the preceding chapter as well as the 
other contributions to this volume within various interpretative traditions of 
state formation studies in order to determine a heuristic ground for better un-
derstanding the parallels, connections and divergences of fifteenth-century 
‘statist’ appearances in the historiography of Islamic West-Asia, and of Western 
Eurasia more generally.1 The main questions at stake are as follows: how have 
researchers operationalized concepts of ‘the state’, of its formation and of its 
transformation within the various historiographical traditions; what conscious 
or unconscious presuppositions and assumptions have driven this operation-
alization; and how has social theory been applied in this process in various 
ways. This discussion of some of the major conceptual debates on ‘the state’ in 
the study of fifteenth-century Western Eurasia will be pursued in a pragmatic 
way. It will be oriented towards identifying and explaining some of the most 
widely or most explicitly used models of state formation within different re-
search traditions. The rationale here complements that of the first, empirical 
chapter in aiming to make fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia’s political his-
tory more accessible and intelligible to wider audiences while also inviting 
specialists of these different traditions to rethink what they know about their 
subjects within wider or unexplored frameworks.
More generally, pursuing these questions and purposes in this chapter en-
ables us to further contextualize the different contributions to this volume’s 
Parts 2 and 3. We aim to make them more intelligible, in entangled and reflex-
ive ways, as representatives of wider research traditions that continue to be 
1 This chapter has been finalized within the context of the project ‘The Mamlukisation of the 
Mamluk Sultanate ii: Historiography, Political Order and State Formation in Fifteenth- 
Century Egypt and Syria’ (UGent, 2017–21); this project has received funding from the Euro-
pean Research Council (erc) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
 innovation program (Consolidator Grant agreement No 681510).
Jan Dumolyn and Jo Van Steenbergen - 9789004431317
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 02:28:41PM
via free access
89Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
dominated by what will be identified here as legalistic readings of ‘the state’. 
Moreover, this chapter also wishes to take stock of the various possibilities for 
genuine comparative research, across and beyond these traditions of Islamic 
West-Asian political history writing. Given the almost complete lack of any 
general ‘historical sociology’ of premodern state formation in Islamic West-
Asia along with the relative paucity of theorizations of explicitly non-Western 
premodern state formation more generally, this chapter also wishes to enrich 
these fields of study with more precise analytical perspectives.2 This includes 
foregrounding conceptual tools that may enhance the comparative potential 
on the Eurasian canvas of empirical historical research such as that which is 
presented in this volume.
After a general introduction presenting some of the main issues at stake in 
the long history of the theoretical study of the premodern state, the second 
part of this chapter briefly discusses the main trends in the substantial existing 
literature on state formation for late medieval and early modern Europe. The 
longer third part of the chapter then presents an in-depth survey of the differ-
ent interpretative frameworks that have informed, and continue to inform, the 
study of rulers and states across fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. This part 
focuses in particular on how (early) Ottomanists, Turkmen and Timurid spe-
cialists, and Mamlukologists have thought about “the state” in their diverse yet 
interconnected research traditions. The chapter ends with some final observa-
tions and suggestions about the comparative value of extant models and ana-
lytical tools to study state formation.
2 For Islamic West-Asia, only a handful of theorizations in more specific studies come close to 
contributing to a historical sociology of ‘the state’ (often, however, without really engaging 
with each other’s ideas). See Paul, Lokale und imperiale Herrschaft; Paul, “Violence and State-
Building in the Islamic East”; Paul, “The State and the Military—a Nomadic Perspective”; 
Lindholm, “Part iii State and Society: Prophets, Caliphs, Sultans, and Tyrants”, in idem, The 
Islamic Middle East; Di Cosmo, “State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History”; 
Crone, “The Tribe and the State”; Donner, “The Formation of the Islamic State”; Lapidus, 
“Tribes and State Formation”; Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership; Clifford, State Formation 
and the structure of politics; Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the modern state; Barkey, Empire of 
Difference. See below for a detailed assessment of the contributions by Marshall Hodgson, Ira 
Lapidus and Michael Chamberlain to this theorization. Furthermore, worth mentioning here 
are also the following attempts to at least marginalize dominant European models, “avoiding 
Eurocentrism and presentism” (Kiser & Levi, “Interpreting”, p. 557), in comparative engage-
ments with (aspects of) premodern state formation: Monson & Scheidel, Fiscal Regimes; 
Bang & Scheidel, Oxford Handbook of the State in the Ancient Near East; Morris & Scheidel, 
Dynamics of Ancient Empires.
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1 Introduction: Defining ‘the state’ between Max Weber, ʿAbd al-
Rahman Ibn Khaldun and Charles Tilly
1.1 Defining What States ‘are’
In a recent comprehensive survey article on modern scholarship’s diverse en-
gagements with the study of the premodern state classicist Walter Scheidel 
noted how there are being used two distinct types of definition of what ‘the 
state’ is, and how it can or should be studied. On the one hand, Scheidel ex-
plains, there are those who formulate exclusive definitions that prioritize mod-
ern Western statist experiences. On the other hand, there are those who pur-
sue inclusive definitions that are in favor of universal heuristic applicability 
across time and space.3 According to Scheidel, this analytical dichotomy is 
“emblematic of a more general rift between legalistic and political science ap-
proaches … [and] approaches of history, anthropology, and sociology”.4 As we 
will argue below, this division has also characterized historiographical visions 
of the state and of its agency in late medieval Europe and fifteenth-century Is-
lamic West-Asia. In fact, the exclusive determinism of ‘the modern state’ has 
for a long time had a substantial impact on these visions, and on their widely-
shared organization around state/society binaries in particular. Especially in 
the study of fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia this impact continues to leave 
many traces until today.
At the same time, from a comparative analytical perspective, it is also clear 
that across the board, the diverse definitions of ‘the state’ in modern scholar-
ship all share a rootedness in Max Weber’s ideal type, with its emphasis on 
the combination of coercion, differentiation, a ruling apparatus and legitimate 
order:
A ‘ruling organization’ (Herrschaftsverband) shall be called a ‘political or-
ganization’ (politischer Verband) if and insofar as its existence and the 
effectiveness of its order (die Geltung seiner Ordnungen) within a speci-
fiable geographical area are continuously safeguarded by the application 
and the threat of physical coercion (physischen Zwangs) on the part of 
the administrative staff (seitens des Verwaltungsstabes). A continuously 
operating compulsory political organization (ein politischer Anstaltsbe-
trieb) shall be called a state (Staat) if and insofar as its administrative 
staff successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion 
3 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 8.
4 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 8.
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(das Monopol legitimen physischen Zwanges) in the implementation of 
its order (die Durchführung der Ordnungen).5
The diverse definitions in modern (Western) scholarship actually share not just 
Weberian roots, but also what Scheidel identifies as “a number of key features”. 
Reviewing seminal contributions to state formation debates by leading histo-
rians and sociologists such as Michael Mann, John Haldon and Charles Tilly,6 
Scheidel concludes that all of the most widely accepted definitions point at 
the usefulness of identifying a power constellation as a ‘state’ if in one way or 
another it combines these three factors: “centralized institutions that impose 
rules, and back them up by force, over a territorially circumscribed population; 
a distinction between the rulers and the ruled; and an element of autonomy, 
stability, and differentiation”.7
To this triad of centralized coercive institutions, socio-political distinction 
and stabilizing political differentiation a fourth factor is very often added refer-
ring back to Weber’s insistence on the centrality of successful claims to order 
and legitimacy. Especially in the study of premodern or early states, this addi-
tional factor has also increasingly been acknowledged as an equally constitu-
tive key feature for any definition of the ‘state’. This concerns the symbolic 
means that underscore the reality of the other three factors and that bind rul-
ers and ruled into the shared imagination of an integrated, even natural, politi-
cal whole. Byzantinist John Haldon and political scientist Jack Goldstone, in 
their own neo-Marxist exploration of a statist definition, stress the importance 
of this factor of “ideological integration”, which in their view often appears in 
the format of “the ‘ritual penetration’ of a society as represented by specific 
5 This is Walter Scheidel’s translation of Max Weber’s definition (the italics are Weber’s), ex-
plaining that “the conventionally quoted English translation in Weber 1978, 55 is imprecise” 
(Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 5). Weber’s German terminology has been added here to 
Scheidel’s translation to underscore the value of his translation, and to convey the subtleties 
of Weber’s definition (from Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 29). This translation is re-
peated, as a “very precise” one, in Hall, “Varieties of State Experience”, p. 61.
6 Mann: “The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in 
the sense that political relations radiate outward to cover a territorially demarcated area, 
over which it claims a monopoly of binding and permanent rule-making, backed up by phys-
ical violence” (Mann, Sources of Social Power, 1: 37); Haldon: “the state represents a set of in-
stitutions and personnel, concentrated spatially at a single point, and exerting authority over 
a territorially distinct area” (Haldon, The State, pp. 32–33); Tilly: “Let us define states as coercion- 
wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise 
clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories” 
(Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 1).
7 Scheidell, “Studying the State”, p. 7.
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sets of social practices that express the legitimacy and belief system underpin-
ning elite and central authority and that generally express and reinforce the 
structure of social relations of production”. Haldon and Goldstone explain that 
ideological integration and ritual penetration actually allow states to survive 
even when those key features of centralization, distinction or differentiation 
are under pressure.8 Many years before Haldon and Goldstone, Joseph Strayer, 
one of the pioneers of European state formation studies, had made this point 
even more forcefully when he explained that “a state exists chiefly in the hearts 
and minds of its people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will 
bring it to life”.9 The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, in one of the most 
compelling contributions to theories of the state and its formation, formulates 
similar insights, famously explaining and formulating the addition of this sym-
bolic feature of ideological integration, ritual penetration and collective imagi-
nation as an explicit elaboration of the traditional Weberian definition.
I would say, using a variation around Max Weber’s famous formula, that 
the state is an X (to be determined) which successfully claims the mo-
nopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a de-
finitive territory and over the totality of the corresponding population. If 
the state is able to exert symbolic violence, it is because it incarnates it-
self simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational 
structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental 
structures and categories of perception and thought. By realizing itself in 
social structures and in the mental structures adapted to them, the insti-
tuted institution makes us forget that it issues out of a long series of acts 
of institution (in the active sense) and hence has all the appearances of 
the natural.10
Following Bourdieu, it indeed seems important for any definition of the state 
to also acknowledge that states are the incarnation of a mutually  constitutive 
8 Goldstone and Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, pp. 10–15, esp. 13.
9 Strayer, Medieval Origins, p. 5.
10 Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State”, pp. 3–4 (italics from the original) (see also Bourdieu, On 
the State, p. 4). In this context of symbolic violence and “ritual politics” as key features of 
statist definitions we should also refer to the contributions to this debate made by the 
neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci, especially in the format of his thinking with the notion of 
‘hegemony’ (Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks; Bates, “Gramsci and the Theo-
ry of Hegemony”), and by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, especially in his Negara: the 
theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali, where he (in)famously argued that “power served 
pomp, not pomp power” (p. 13).
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combination of a hegemonic discourse and of an apparatus of coercion, dis-
tinction and differentiation. As such, states display a tendency to appear as 
natural or even meta-historical forms of political organization, which is how-
ever no more than a function of their existential claims to legitimacy and to 
any self-defined form of statehood. Rather than merely being as they thus ap-
pear, states are always in the process of becoming, in an endless “series of acts 
of institution”. “[S]tates are never ‘formed’ once and for all”, as George Stein-
metz explains in his exploration of the study of the state-culture nexus. “It 
is more fruitful to view state-formation as the ongoing process of structural 
change and not as a one-time event”.11 In any definition or attempt at analy-
sis, therefore, what matters most is this process of a state’s endless formation, 
and transformation, as that incarnation of a mutually constitutive combina-
tion of a hegemonic discourse and of an apparatus of coercion, distinction and 
differentiation.
1.2 Defining How States ‘become’
For Bourdieu, and for many like him, this endless act of state formation hap-
pens simultaneously in the “objectivity” of social structures and in the “subjec-
tivity” of mental structures. Often, this is thought to happen in a dialectic inter-
action between power structures, or between varying combinations of such 
structures and all kinds of non-state phenomena.12 In many cases more spe-
cific moments in this process of formation are identified and defined, mostly 
as heuristic tools for analytical purposes rather than as actual stages in any te-
leological trajectory. In this respect, Goldstone and Haldon speak of a “line 
from local state to supra-local state to empire (and back again)”.13 More specifi-
cally, they explain how
At one extreme of socio-political organization, the term “state” can re-
fer to a relatively short-lived grouping of tribal or clan communities 
united under a warlord or chieftain who is endowed with both symbolic 
and military authority—in anthropological terms, a “Big-man” confed-
eracy. […] At the other extreme we find more or less territorially unified 
political entities, with an organizational “center” (which may be peripa-
tetic) from which a ruler or ruling group exercises political authority and 
that maintains its existence successfully over several generations; a key 
11 Steinmetz, “Introduction”, p. 9.
12 See e.g. Mann’s notion of a ‘dialectics of empire’ generating “a long-term developmental 
tendency” (Mann, Sources of Social Power, 1:161).
13 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 6.
Jan Dumolyn and Jo Van Steenbergen - 9789004431317
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 02:28:41PM
via free access
Dumolyn and Van Steenbergen94
<UN>
element in the formation and degree of permanence of such formations 
is that the authority of the ruler or ruling group is recognized as both 
legitimate and exclusive.14
In Goldstone and Haldon’s very wide-ranging historical model, state formation 
between these extremes is not simply a contingent function of dialectic inter-
action between power structures, but “a longer-term evolutionary process in 
which social habits and institutions and state organizations respond to chang-
ing conditions through […] ‘competitive selection’ of practices”.15 In this evolu-
tionary process towards social transcendence and autonomy and towards a 
high degree of political integration and permanence, Goldstone and Haldon 
describe how “the potential for state formations to reproduce themselves” ap-
pears as a central feature.16 In this respect, they reformulate Bourdieu’s idea of 
“the instituted institution” in historically and materially more concrete terms, 
which arguably represent some of the main heuristic parameters that are cur-
rently used in historical state formation studies:
The state becomes a specialized and dominant set of institutions, which 
may even undertake the creation ab initio of its own administrative per-
sonnel and that can survive only by maintaining control over the appro-
priation and distribution of surplus wealth that this specialized person-
nel administers.17
Goldstone and Haldon’s analytical model of an evolutionary process shift-
ing back and forth between two extremes appears here perhaps most clear-
ly as deeply rooted in a Marxist interpretation of modes of production.18 At 
the same time, they also explicitly acknowledge their indebtedness to other 
 traditions. These included the ideas formulated by the fourteenth century 
North-African scholar ʿAbd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406),19 who famous-
ly described the process of social formation from a nomadic chieftaincy to a 
14 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, pp. 5–6.
15 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 7. This argument fol-
lows Runciman, Treatise.
16 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 8.
17 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 8. This mainly follows 
Mann, Sources of Social Power, volume i (see also below).
18 For a brief critique of neo-Marxist notions of state formation, see Steinmetz, “Introduc-
tion”, pp. 14–15 (focusing in particular on “Gramsci’s writings on hegemony” and “Ander-
son’s historical studies of antiquity, feudalism, and absolutism”).
19 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 7.
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bureaucratic-administrative power constellation as a highly competitive itera-
tive one, determined chiefly by social identities and relationships, economic 
structures, urbanization and cultural production and consumption. For Ibn 
Khaldun, nomadic formations are most powerful in social terms, but economi-
cally they remain relatively weak; their inevitable military empowerment is 
therefore bound to target economic empowerment as well, both of which ma-
terialize best in urban contexts of defense, accumulation, differentiation and 
distinction. However, the impact of the latter processes, including on social 
power, is transformative for the ruling constellation of the ‘state’ (al-dawla). 
Over time this ‘state’ becomes entirely dependent on new administrative per-
sonnel for its maintenance of control and authority, and at the same time is 
bound to collapse under the pressure of a new nomadic formation and its fresh 
social power.20
This tradition of imagining the endless act of state formation in a naturally 
occurring iterative succession of different forms of political organization actu-
ally has its equivalents in Mediterranean antiquity. It appears most explicitly 
in Book 6 of The Histories by the second century bce Greek historian and poli-
tician Polybius of Megalopolis (ca. 200–118 bce). Polybius explains how there 
are three forms of political organization (politeias)—kingship (basileias), aris-
tocracy and democracy—and how time and again each of these three forms 
degenerates into its lesser equivalent—tyranny, oligarchy and mob-rule 
(okhlokratia)—, just as a living organism experiences birth, rise, decay and 
death. For Polybius the latter natural experience of life also marks the succes-
sion of these forms, with mob-rule eventually giving way to the chaos out of 
which a new strongman will rise as monarch, and the cycle of political organi-
zation (politeiōn anakyklosis) restarts.21 Ibn Khaldun’s and Polybius’ thinking 
about state formation appears as very different, also demonstrating how they 
operated and embedded their theories in very different political contexts and 
concepts—fourteenth-century ce nomadic power and Islamic urban efflores-
cence in North-Africa and West-Asia for the former, Greek integration into the 
freshly won Roman domination of the second-century bce Mediterranean 
world for the latter. On a more abstract level Ibn Khaldun’s and Polybius’ mod-
ellings nevertheless also have many features in common, from their iterative 
logics and firm beliefs in the degenerating nature of power to their assump-
tions about the naturally increasing complexity of political organization and 
20 Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima; Martinez-Gros, Ibn Khaldûn.
21 Polybius, The Histories, Volume iii, book vi (ii. On the Forms of States), pp. 294/5–318/9; 
Polybius. The Histories, p. xix.
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their conceptions of that organization’s active, even reproductive, integration 
of ever more stakeholders.22
Another seminal tradition to which Goldstone and Haldon explicitly refer as 
a source of inspiration—“Weber’s concept”—brings us back to the opening 
paragraphs of this chapter’s introduction, to the Weberian tradition.23 It is well 
known that Weber identified “three pure types of legitimate authority” (drei rein-
er Typen legitimer Herrschaft), which in many ways also remind us of Polybius’, 
and for that matter Ibn Khaldun’s, modellings. In line with Weber’s aforemen-
tioned definition of a state as “a political organization [that] […] successfully 
claims the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion in the implementation of 
its order”, these three analytical types differ along the fundamentally different 
rational, traditional or charismatic “grounds” (Charakters) on which they suc-
cessfully make those claims, famously giving way to “legal authority” (legale 
Herrschaft), to “traditional authority” (traditionale Herrschaft) or to “charis-
matic authority” (charismatische Herrschaft) respectively. Weber usefully sum-
marizes the socio-cultural essence of each of these three types as follows:
In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established 
impersonal order (der legal gesatzten sachlichen unpersönlichen Ord-
nung). It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it 
(durch sie bestimmten Vorgesetzten) by virtue of the formal legality of 
their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office 
(kraft formaler Legalität seiner Anordnungen und in deren Umkreis). In the 
case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the person of the chief 
who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who 
is (within its sphere) bound by tradition (der Person des durch Tradition 
berufenen und an die Tradition [in deren Bereich] gebundenen Herrn). But 
here the obligation of obedience is a matter of personal loyalty within the 
area of accustomed obligations (kraft Pietät im Umkreis des Gewohnten). 
In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically qualified 
leader (dem charismatisch qualifizierten Führer) as such who is obeyed by 
virtue of personal trust in his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary 
qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual’s belief in his 
charisma (im Umkreis der Geltung des Glaubens an dieses sein Charisma).24
22 See also Duindam, “Dynasty and Elites”, pp. 2–3.
23 Goldstone & Haldon, “Ancient States, Empires, and Exploitation”, p. 7.
24 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 124; translation from Weber, Economy and Society, 
p. 216.
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Weber basically conceptualizes political transformation as a process of ra-
tionalization from personal to impersonal forms of political organization, to-
wards the ideal type of legal authority “and its typical expression in  bureaucracy” 
(seinen spezifischen Typus in der ‘Bürokratie’), and away from the charismatic 
and traditional types, the latter “typically represented by patriarchalism” (im 
‘Patriarchalismus’ typisch repräsentiert).25 In premodern times, however, the 
charismatic and, especially, the traditional types always remained predomi-
nant for Weber, especially in patriarchalism’s more complex manifestation in 
patrimonialism (Patrimonialismus), representing an expansion and semi-bu-
reaucratization of the ruler’s personal power, and at the same time “a decen-
tralization of the household […] [which] leads inevitably to an attenuation of 
full patriarchal power (führt unvermeidlich zu einer inneren Abschwächung der 
vollen Hausgewalt)”.26 As will also transpire from the survey below, this typol-
ogy of charismatic, traditional and legal power has arguably been as influential 
in modern, especially historical, studies of that endless act of state formation, 
as Weber’s aforementioned definition of the state has been. A case in point, 
especially for West-Asian historiography, is Karl Wittfogel’s much debated and 
largely outdated model of ‘oriental despotism’. In its alleged historical manifes-
tation in the format of Asian ‘hydraulic empires’ this highly influential model-
ling was obviously informed by Marx’s historical materialism and his concep-
tualization of an ‘Asiatic mode of production’.27 In its imagination of the 
organization of discretionary personal power, however, it was rather more akin 
to the “extreme case” (im Höchtsmaß der Herrengewalt) of bureaucratic patri-
monialism that Weber identified as ‘sultanism’ (Sultanismus).28
In speaking of ‘sultanism’ as an “extreme case” and identifying it as the out-
come of a “transition” (Unterschied) that is “continuous” (fließend) and moves 
from tradition to discretion, Weber’s conceptualization of political transforma-
tion appears more complex (and Eurocentric) than any uniform and one- 
directional process of rationalization accounts for.29 In fact, his understanding 
25 Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 612; translation from Weber, Economy and Society, 
p. 954.
26 Weber Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 682; translation from Weber, Economy and Society, 
p. 1010.
27 Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism; see also Curtis, Orientalism and Islam, pp. 217–257.
28 See Weber Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 133–134; Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 231–232. 
Weber also explicitly referred to “Oriental sultanism” and to “the Near East [as] … the clas-
sic location of ‘sultanism’” (p. 1020). The assumptions that inform these ‘orientalisms’ 
have by now been seriously problematized and falsified (see e.g. Curtis, Orientalism and 
Islam, esp. ‘Chapter 9. Max Weber: patrimonialism as a political type’, pp. 258–298).
29 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 231; also p. 232 (Weber Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 134): 
“Where domination is primarily traditional, even though it is exercised by virtue of the 
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of this relationship between patriarchal/patrimonial and sultanistic authority 
arguably displays surprising parallels with Ibn Khaldun’s and, especially, Poly-
bius’ assumptions about the degenerating nature of (traditional) power. For 
Weber, indeed, premodern state formation must be analyzed against the patri-
monial background of “the continuous struggle of the central power with the 
various centrifugal local powers”, an endless oscillation between the central-
izing and decentralizing tendencies that are identified as patrimonialism’s 
“specific problem”. In fact, in many ways this incorporates another iterative 
logic of political organizations waxing and waning between ad hoc and more 
complex power constellations (at least until, for Weber, modern rationalism 
enabled Europe to escape from that logic).30
More generally, iterative models such as those of Ibn Khaldun, Polybius, 
and—at least for non-European political organization—Weber, and evolu-
tionary models of state formation, which inform approaches such as Wittfo-
gel’s or for that matter of modern legalistic and political sciences, both seem 
to be ideal types at the extremities of a rich continuum of interpretations of 
that endless historical act of a state’s formation. Most of these interpretations, 
however, including that of Goldstone and Haldon and more generally also that 
of Weber himself, situate themselves somewhere in between these evolution-
ary and iterative variables, trying both to avoid the pitfalls of determinism 
and also to allow for entropy. From a generalizing perspective, therefore, it ap-
pears more relevant to accept the reality of this analytical continuum in state 
formation studies than to identify where exactly on that continuum these and 
many more conceptualizations are to be situated. In fact, the most interesting 
general insight may well be that the variables that tend to be operationalized 
in this respect by most, if not all, relevant studies continue to relate directly 
to the shared essence of Ibn Khaldun’s and Polybius’ aforementioned concep-
tions and assumptions about the entropically increasing complexity of po-
litical organization and its active, even reproductive, integration of ever more 
stakeholders.
ruler’s personal autonomy, it will be called patrimonial authority; where it indeed oper-
ates primarily on the basis of discretion (freier traditionsungebundener Willkür), it will be 
called sultanism (sultanistische [Herrschaft]). The transition is definitely continuous (Der 
Unterschied is durchaus fließend). Both forms of domination are distinguished from ele-
mentary patriarchalism by the presence of a personal staff”.
30 Weber Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 712; translation from Weber, Economy and Society, 
p. 1055. On this cyclical logic, see also Mann, Sources of Social Power, 1:172. For a critique on 
Weber’s belief that only Europe manages to escape from this logic of traditionalism via its 
particular manifestation in the format of feudalism and its subsequent process of Euro-
pean urbanization, see Steinmetz, “Introduction”, pp. 15–16: ‘Weber and the Relegation of 
Culture to Non-Western and Premodern Sites’.
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1.3 Defining What States ‘do’
Another insight that follows from this generalizing perspective is that the 
state—as the integrative-cum-entropic process of the formation and transfor-
mation of an apparatus of coercion, distinction and differentiation in a mutu-
ally constituent combination with a hegemonic discourse—is, and always has 
been, experienced as a dominant mode of organization in history. “It appears 
that from very small beginnings some five thousand or more years ago”, Scheidel 
remarks, “the state soon became the demographically dominant type of hu-
man political organization”.31 As a result, studies of the state have also always 
revolved around, and been inspired by, questions about states’ actual roles in, 
and impact on, history. Alongside questions about the state’s definition and 
formation, another big issue at stake in studies of the premodern state has thus 
been: What does the state actually do? Governing society, or social groups, 
communities and formations, seems the most obvious and most widely con-
templated answer here. Even so, the empirical reality of the minimalist nature 
of government in premodern contexts often tends to add important caveats to 
this kind of answer. Sociologist Anthony Giddens importantly remarks in this 
respect that
[i]t is misleading to describe the forms of rule typically found in non-
modern states as ‘government’, if ‘government’ means a concern of the 
state with the regularized administration of the overall territory claimed 
as its own. Traditional states did not ‘govern’ in this sense. Their ‘polities’ 
were mainly limited to the governance of conflicts within the dominant 
classes, and within the main urban centres.32
For most of human history, states simply did not have, aspire to, or consider ac-
quiring, the power, resources and instruments to discipline a ‘society’ in the 
maximalist ways that the modern notion of ‘government’ suggests.33 At least, 
studies of the state have never stopped to grapple with the measure—whether 
minimalist or rather more maximalist—of this state-society relationship. An 
important voice in this debate undoubtedly is that of sociologist and historian 
Charles Tilly, whose contribution to state formation studies of late medieval and 
early modern Europe has been crucial (see below). For Tilly, states engage pri-
marily in war-making against external enemies, in state-making by integrating 
31 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 14.
32 Giddens, Nation-State, p. 57 (italics by Giddens); also referred to in Scheidel, “Studying the 
State”, pp. 16–17.
33 On this specific point, see also Mann, “Autonomous Power of the State”; Ando & Richard-
son, Ancient States and infrastructural power.
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or excluding internal competitors, in protecting their main supporters and allies 
against enemies or competitors, and in extracting resources from subject popu-
lations to enable war-making, state-making and protection.34 This focus on 
practices of exclusion, integration, reproduction and appropriation, however, at 
the same time implies that there are also many things that pre-modern states did 
not do. Many, if not most, voices in the field would certainly agree with the impli-
cation that Bourdieu’s aforementioned claim that the state exerts “violence over 
a definitive territory and over the totality of the corresponding population” 
seems too maximalist (and perhaps also too modern) a definition.35 Weber, 
again, appears to have been more nuanced in his understanding of this state-
society relationship. As Scheidel explains, this is a nuance that easily tends to be 
forgotten, making Weber even more useful for studies of the premodern state 
than is generally acknowledged:
It is worth noting […] that Weber speaks essentially of a claim to legiti-
mate force in the enforcement of state rules, and does not envision an ef-
fective monopoly on physical coercion per se. In this regard, his approach 
fits the situation of early states with their diffused coercive capabilities 
better than is sometimes realized.36
Among the multiple imaginations of the nature and impact of these “diffused 
coercive capabilities” Tilly’s interlocking practices of exclusion, integration, 
reproduction and appropriation certainly stand out as referential, and are rep-
resented at least partly in most studies of what premodern states do. At the 
same time, quite a few scholars wish to go several steps further with the mini-
malism implied, questioning in varying degrees the very reality of the state-
society relation. One important voice in this debate was certainly social an-
thropologist Ernest Gellner. Gellner actually preferred to think of pre-modern 
state-society relations in terms of social segmentation, with a horizontally ori-
ented elite constituting the state, and extracting taxes from and maintaining 
34 Tilly, “War Making and State Making”, p. 181; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 
p. 96; also referred to in Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 20. For Tilly, each activity gener-
ated its own agents and agencies, from armies over policing executives and courts to fiscal 
institutions.
35 Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State”, p. 3. See also Loyal, Bourdieu’s Theory of the State, 
pp. 111–121 (‘How Penetrating is State Thought?’, in Chapter 7: An Assessment of  Bourdieu’s 
Theory of the State).
36 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 5. Weber literally speaks of the legitimate use of coercion 
“in the implementation of its order (die Durchführung der Ordnungen)” (Weber, Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft, p. 29).
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peace (and segregation) between otherwise largely disconnected social units 
of local communities.37 Other modern scholars tend to push the analytical bal-
ance in favor of what Gellner identified as communities, strictly avoiding over-
structuralist or top-down approaches and incorporating into their thinking 
varying notions of the state’s social constructedness. Following Michel Fou-
cault’s insistence on the ubiquitous, ‘capillary’ and productive nature of power, 
Middle-East historian Tim Mitchell questions the very notion of the state as a 
social actor, and suggests that any kind of state/non-state interaction should 
not be taken “as the starting point of the analysis, but as an uncertain outcome 
of the historical process”.38 For Mitchell, the state should be understood as “a 
structural effect” of that process, which although “appearing as an apparatus 
that stands apart from the rest of the social world” in actual fact should be 
studied as the product of diverse social practices and arrangements that, im-
portantly, also “produce the apparent separateness of the state and create ef-
fects of agency and partial autonomy, with concrete consequences”.39 In this 
conception, coercion, distinction, differentiation and hegemony do not neces-
sarily constitute any coherent apparatus of power, but rather a diverse and 
contingent set of social relations, which simultaneously create an effect of 
their own appearance as a coherent apparatus.40 In other words, states do not 
make history, but history makes states, as and when successful social practices 
of exclusion, integration, reproduction and appropriation start to appear and 
present themselves as a coherent apparatus of coercion, distinction, differen-
tiation and hegemony.
37 Gellner, Nations, pp. 8–18; also referred to in Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 16.
38 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, p. 74.
39 Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, pp. 90–91 (“Conceived in this way, the state is no longer to 
be taken as essentially an actor, with the coherence, agency, and subjectivity this term 
presumes. We should not ask ‘Who is the state?’, or ‘Who dictates its policies?’ Such ques-
tions presume what their answers pretend to prove: that some political subject, some 
who, preexists and determines those multiple arrangements we call the state. The ar-
rangements that produce the apparent separateness of the state create the abstract effect 
of agency, with concrete consequences. Yet such agency will always be contingent upon 
the production of difference—upon those practices that create the apparent boundary 
between state and society. These arrangements may be so effective, however, as to make 
things appear the reverse of this. The state comes to seem a subjective starting point, as 
an actor that intervenes in society”.); also in Mitchell, “Society, Economy and the State 
Effect”, p. 84.
40 Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, pp. 93–94; Mitchell (and Foucault) admittedly focus pri-
marily on the modern state; for an argument in favor of this approach to also understand-
ing other, premodern statist appearances, see Van Steenbergen, “‘Mamlukisation’ be-
tween social theory and social practice”, pp. 26–27.
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In rethinking the state in this bottom-up manner, Mitchell actually takes 
direct issue with another, even more minimalist, trend in state studies. “The 
importance of the state as a common ideological and cultural construct”, 
Mitchell argues,
should be grounds not for dismissing the phenomenon in favor of some 
supposedly more neutral and accurate concept (such as political system), 
but for taking it seriously. Politics, after all, is a process built out of such 
shared constructs.41
This ‘cultural’ turn in state studies has indeed also given way to an analytical 
trend that involved even more radical questionings of the usefulness of the 
state as a heuristic concept to understand the social realities and impact of 
power. Seminal contributions to this include a posthumously published pa-
per by historical sociologist Philip Abrams about “the difficulty of studying 
the state”, given what he described as “the secret of the non-existence of the 
state”.42 Perhaps one even more significant contribution is a survey about the 
uses and abuses of the state concept in European medieval studies by medi-
eval historian Rees Davies who concluded that “the state has been given far 
too privileged a role in the analyses of power in earlier societies”.43 This critical 
line of minimalist, if not nihilist, thought was informed by a growing unease 
with the dominant evolutionary paradigm of the medieval origins of European 
modern states (see below). It also displayed many belated echoes of similar 
debates that have been raging in the political sciences since the mid-twentieth 
century.44 This approach found its most explicit medievalist representative in 
a survey history of later medieval European politics first published in 2009 by 
John Watts, an historian of late medieval England (see also below). Watts even 
argued that “it is not necessary to frame—one might almost say burden—the 
structural history of politics with the notion of the state”.45 As a result, Watts 
41 Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, p. 81.
42 Abrams, “Difficulty of Studying the State”, p. 77. (“The state is, then, in every sense of the 
term a triumph of concealment. It conceals the real history and relations of subjection 
behind an a-historical mask of legitimating illusion: contrives to deny the existence of 
connections and conflicts which would if recognised be incompatible with the claimed 
autonomy and integration of the state. The real official secret, however, is the secret of the 
non-existence of the state”.).
43 Davies, “The Medieval State”, p. 289.
44 See Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, pp. 77–89 for a sketch and appraisal of this debate, in-
cluding of Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back in”.
45 Watts, Making of Polities, p. 35.
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decided not to speak of the state at all, but to adopt “a more open-ended per-
spective on the changing political structures of the period”.46
This dismissive attitude, however, is certainly not the dominant position in 
state formation studies at large. Echoing Mitchell’s above-mentioned criticism, 
John Haldon was perhaps one of those who warned most forcefully against 
throwing out the baby with the bath water when pushing a minimalist ap-
proach to these extreme ends.
It is important to stress that the state does have an identity as a field of 
action, as a role-constituting site of power and practices which can be 
independent, under certain preconditions, of the economic and political 
interests of those who dominate it.47
As in the case of Middle East historian Timothy Mitchell, Haldon entered this 
debate from a rather different background, not as a specialist of Western Eu-
rope but as a Byzantinist. In his thinking about the state as a tool in premod-
ern historical research he was concerned with a far more theoretical “Marxist 
approach to the State”. Haldon asked questions on a Eurasian scale about “a 
historical materialist approach to the state, state elites, the relative or absolute 
autonomy of state structures and practices, and the role of the economic in 
Marxist historical interpretation”.48 From his Eurasian and comparative per-
spectives Haldon actually recasted these debates between minimalists and 
maximalists in interestingly processual terms. Ascribing to the aforementioned 
notion of state formation as an endless process, he stressed “that state forma-
tions differ qualitatively in the degree of their ‘stateness’”, forbearing any com-
parisons between their historical manifestations across time and space that 
do not take into account the specifics of “very different structural contexts”.49 
Any study of states and of their impact on human history should therefore 
internalize the assumption that all statist manifestations are specific and can 
46 Watts, Making of Polities, p. 35. For Watts “political structures” are “the frames and forms 
and patterns in which politics took place; frames, forms and patterns which conditioned 
those politics, and which also … had some role to play in causing, as well as explaining, 
political action”. (p. 35). This position was recently re-iterated in perhaps a more nuanced 
and open way in De Weerdt, Holmes & Watts, “Politics, c. 1000–1500”, p. 262. (“Today’s 
historians of medieval politics are more likely to be concerned with process rather than 
with trajectory and outcomes, and while, as we shall see, this by no means forecloses 
considerations of ‘the state’, political history does not have to be framed by that particular 
problematic”.).
47 Haldon, The State, p. 33; referred to in Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 22.
48 Haldon, The State, p. 32.
49 Haldon, The State, p. 33.
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only be considered as contextually defined exceptions of any one analytical 
model that may be employed. Rather than trying to reduce that specificity and 
exceptionality to, prioritize their features within, or exclude them from a stat-
ist ideal, what should matter most in comparative, and, for that matter, non-
comparative historical research is to use that ideal to acknowledge for, and 
to decipher, specificity and exceptionality.50 Scheidel believes that it is Tilly’s 
“model of state formation driven by interstate and class conflict”, through the 
interplay of war-making and state-making, that “holds promise for the study of 
any historical period, even as we must avoid the transfer of specifically Euro-
pean features to other environments”.51 The latter critical distance may well be 
achieved by identifying where and how Tilly’s model resonates with or may be 
further refined by the thinking of others, including Max Weber, Ibn Khaldun 
and Polybius.
2 Studying State Formation in Late Medieval Europe
Empirical studies on ‘the state’ in the Middle Ages—even if we limit ourselves 
for now to those dealing with Western Europe—are so numerous and diverse 
that it would be impossible to offer more than an outline of some general his-
toriographical trends which are relevant to the present discussion. Until World 
War i, state formation was not an issue that would have been explicitly formu-
lated by most traditional western medievalists. As will be detailed below, with 
the notable exception of theoretical discussions on the applicability of the 
modern concept of ‘the state’ on medieval society within German legal history, 
the concepts of ‘state formation’ or ‘state-building’ only really became popular 
in mainstream medieval historiography during the mid-1970s and 1980s when 
historical sociologists working in the Weberian and Marxist traditions had put 
it on the agenda more explicitly.
Territorialstaaten was an expression which German medievalists already 
used sometimes at the end of the nineteenth century, but otherwise the term 
‘state’ was primarily used in the specific case of the ‘Papal state’ or in discus-
sions of ‘Church and state’ inspired by contemporary conflicts.52 Some preco-
cious explicit examples of the use of the term ‘state formation’ include, for 
50 This necessary focus on the specific and on the apparently exceptional “to establish the 
distinctiveness [Eigenart]” of historical phenomena was also formulated and emphasized 
as part of any truly meaningful comparative approach by Weber (Weber, Economy and 
Society, p. xxxvii).
51 Scheidel, “Studying the State”, p. 38.
52 For instance in the English translation of Ranke’s work: von Ranke, History of the Popes.
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instance, Vaughan’s 1962 work on the Burgundian Duke Philip the Bold, and a 
remarkable earlier 1909 article by the Belgian medieval historian Henri Pirenne 
on ‘the formation’ of the Burgundian state.53 As we will see below, Pirenne’s 
powerful and systematic approach ensured that state building would become 
a central concept in Burgundian history. This approach rivaled the historiogra-
phy of the two most centralized medieval Kingdoms France and England, and 
to a lesser degree the Iberian monarchies, leaving the decentralized Holy Ro-
man Empire or the city-states of Italy mostly at the fringe of the debate (or else 
being studied in terms of why state formation before the nineteenth century 
had failed in these regions). Pirenne apologized to the traditionally empiricist 
readers of his time that “state is a modern term”, but also affirmed that it was 
not an arbitrary notion but rather one “based on historic fact”.
At the origin of Pirenne’s observations was the German legal idea of the re-
centralization of public authority, which had been fragmented as a result of 
feudalism, into a modern Staatsgewalt. Before that time medievalists had most-
ly discussed questions of the growth of state power or public authority just in 
passing when dealing with the personalities and policies of princes. By the end 
of the nineteenth century the problem was being posed in more explicit terms. 
Von Below already consciously used the expression ‘state’ for the Empire as a 
whole. He was clearly inspired by Hegel’s teleological philosophy in which the 
development of the state was a necessary objective to guarantee the wellbeing 
of a people.54 In 1904, the French legal historian Jacques Flach, for instance, 
also considered the efforts of the Capetian kings to reestablish royal power 
over a France torn apart by feudal anarchy to be a “renaissance of the state”.55 
For his part, Heinrich Mitteis, the most influential legal historian of the first 
half of the twentieth century, used the notion of the Personenverbandsstaat for 
the central Middle Ages, defining it as a state based upon the association of 
persons rather than a modern state with bureaucratic institutions.56 The main 
concern for medievalists became identifying a state which was ‘impersonal’ in 
the sense that it was detached from the person of the prince. This implied that 
the rule of the state was supported by a theoretical construct based not only 
upon principles of law and governance but also by an apparatus of govern-
ment offices whose actual institutional functioning was not solely controlled 
by the prince’s arbitrary decisions. In an intellectual climate dominated by 
53 Vaughan, Philip the bold; Pirenne, “The Formation and Constitution of the Burgundian 
State”.
54 Von Below, Der deutsche Staat des Mittelalters.
55 Flach, Les origines de l’ancienne France. Vol. 3.
56 Mitteis, Lehnrecht und Staatsgewalt; idem, Der Staat des hohen Mittelalters.
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thinkers like Hegel and Ranke, the idealist and hermeneutic trend within Ger-
man historiography inevitably considered the state foremost as an idea, an ab-
stract legal notion, or in more practical terms, as an administrative and politi-
cal entity apart from the person of the prince.57
It was this incipient usage of the term which, in 1909, inspired Pirenne, a 
more materialistically oriented historian who mostly focused upon socio- 
economic processes. Pirenne also spoke of ‘states’ in the Middle Ages, although 
he emphasized that the Burgundian state was larger than the separate princi-
palities in the Holy Roman Empire thus denoted. Pirenne’s focus traditionally 
remained on dynastic politics but he also systematically considered the posi-
tions of the cities and the nobility within this process, as well as the relationship 
between “political centralization” and “social and economic changes”, the evo-
lution of central institutions and the creation of a standing army by the dukes. 
In short, he developed a surprisingly modern and sociological approach for a 
historian of those days.58 Similarly, building mostly on German scholarship, in 
1936 Sir Frederick Powicke also made a critical assessment of “the problems the 
word ‘state’ suggests when it is applied to medieval society”. A careful empiricist, 
taking into account a variety of types of medieval documents, he opted to speak 
of a state as the condition in which a ruling power had firmly established its 
authority over other powerful groups in a given territory, but his analysis lacked 
any systematics and would continue to set the tone in British medieval history 
with its longtime fear for any kind of sociological generalizations apart from the 
national parliamentary mythology present in Whig History.59
In the meantime, another line of theory on the modern state and its forma-
tion came not from legal and institutional history but from philosophy and the 
new discipline of sociology. Hegel’s Beamtenstaat and his praise for the admin-
istrative class of Prussia had laid the foundations for the concepts of the state 
upheld by both Marx and Weber. However, of these two great sociologists only 
the latter would have a real impact on medieval history before World War ii. As 
suggested above, for European history at least Weber’s focus was on the au-
tonomy of the administrative and legal institutions from the political sphere of 
decision making, on processes of rationalization and bureaucratization and on 
the monopoly of legitimate force to effectively exercise domination in a regular 
manner within a given territory. To some degree a co-thinker of Weber while 
also departing from his viewpoints on many matters, the Prussian Otto Hintze 
was one of the first historians to analyze state formation as a process which had 
57 See Post, “Law and Politics in the Middle Ages”.
58 Pirenne, “The Formation and Constitution of the Burgundian State”.
59 Powicke, “Reflections on the Medieval State”.
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to be systematically tackled with clear conceptual tools. In his “constitutional 
and administrative history” (or to cite the better German term ‘Verfassungs- 
und Verwaltungsgeschichte’), he focused on the relations between specific 
types of states (he considered these historical forms to be “real types” based on 
concrete historical observation as opposed to Weber’s “ideal types”) with spe-
cific forces in society. He for instance distinguished between “sovereign states” 
developing from more centralized forms of feudalism and “commercial states” 
supported by bourgeois capitalism.60
The points of view of both Weber and Hintze, however, were soon strongly 
criticized by another influential medieval historian, the Nazi-party member 
Otto Brunner. Brunner opposed analyzing medieval lordship in such modern 
terms influenced by liberal constitutionalism and also criticized the Hegelian 
opposition between state and society that Weber and Hintze had maintained. 
For Brunner medieval notions of lordship as well as community had to be ana-
lyzed in their own terms, focusing on the legal expressions used at the time. In 
the tradition of Otto von Gierke’s Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht which posited 
that collective associations were at the basis of medieval society, Brunner 
stressed the interaction between the notion of Herrschaft, based on the per-
sonal ties between rulers and subjects and other Persönenverbande on the one 
hand, and the Genossenschaft principle on the other.61 The concept of legiti-
mate rule or Herrschaft and hence the ideological representations of state 
power and their interactions with theology were first systematically studied by 
two other German far right historians: Percy Schramm and Ernst Kantorowicz. 
Schramm studied the symbols of the medieval state, thus focusing on the 
Hegelian idea of the state rather than on its material support. Kantorowicz ar-
gued that the fourteenth-century state assumed some of the sacred power of 
the Church.62
During the 1940s and 1950s, the term state was still rarely used by medieval 
historians, but during the 1960s this began to change for good with some con-
ceptual discussions and with notable works such as the one by the Spanish 
early modern historian José Antonio Maravall. Maravall studied the later medi-
eval origins of an early modern state in elaborate detail from the point of view 
of developing ‘modern’ mentalities in Spain and the cultural control of the 
absolutist monarchs on the nobility.63 Of more lasting importance, however, 
were the contributions by the American medievalists Joseph Strayer and 
60 Hintze, Staat und Verfassung.
61 Brunner, Land und Herrschaft; von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht.
62 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies; Schramm, Herrschaftszeichnen und Staatssymbolik.
63 Maravall, Estado moderno y mentalidad social.
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Gaines Post. For the aforementioned Strayer, the comparative analysis of gov-
ernment institutions should be the key method used to discover a growth of 
state power between the twelfth and the seventeenth centuries. Strayer’s focus 
was legal, administrative and financial, and used an explicit top-down perspec-
tive. In Strayer’s view the early modern state had developed from medieval em-
bryonic state structures originating in the twelfth century into more efficient 
government institutions with appointed and permanent office-holders replac-
ing the prevailing feudal and hereditary fragmentation of power amongst the 
hands of noble lineages. A second crucial development was the creation and 
strengthening of royal courts of law. As these institutional developments also 
permitted better control of revenues, a third crucial factor in state formations 
was the centralization of taxation, an element which Charles Tilly picked up 
on somewhat later. The logical conclusion for historians was to see Philip the 
Fair’s reign in France around the turn of the fourteenth century as a breaking 
point. The prince, supported by his centralizing legists, had already been con-
sidered as the archetype of the medieval state-builder before Strayer’s work. 
According to Strayer, in the later Middle Ages, however, crisis and war would 
temporarily suspend this process of state-building through institutional cen-
tralization.64 In the meantime, Strayer’s close colleague Gaines Post held on to 
a legal conception of a state, defining it in terms of public law and medieval 
‘political theory’, or in other words in terms of the legal, theological and moral 
principles of governance upheld by contemporary authors.65 In this sense his 
approach was complementary to Strayer’s but also remained rooted in the tra-
ditions of German historiography. And in fact, this research tradition of look-
ing for ‘ideas of the state’ in learned theological and legal treatises and dealing 
with the reception of Roman Law that had started in the nineteenth century 
still continues today.66 The influence notably of the legal historical tradition 
and the work of Hintze and Brunner in Germany and that of Strayer and 
Guenée in the US and France is still present in more traditional empirical stud-
ies dealing with some aspects of state formation.
The next impetus in the debate came indeed from France, and notably from 
the work of Bernard Guenée, who saw in later medieval state formation a dual-
ity and a dialogue between the person of the ruler and the communities of the 
realm represented by the estates.67 The combined influence of the older legal-
historical tradition and Strayer and Guenée’s emphasis on the role of state 
64 Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State; idem, The Reign of Philip the Fair.
65 Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought.
66 See e.g. Canning, “Ideas of the State”.
67 Guenée, L’Occident aux xivè et xvè siècles.
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elites led to a renewed focus on the role of the legists and other officers of the 
state. That role could only be studied systematically by making use of proso-
pography, the collective biography of the elites which had also been applied, 
for instance, in Roman history, and this is still a prominent way of tackling the 
question of state formation, also of non-Western societies. The concept of po-
litical society which Guenée introduced led to an emphasis on representative 
institutions and their delegates as both counterweights and collaborators of 
the state building process, again through a combination of institutional and 
prosopographical approaches. This school of thought was continued by schol-
ars such as Blockmans, Genet and Bulst and gave rise to a fruitful series of stud-
ies during the 1980s and 1990s.68
However, it was the influence of the new wave of historical sociology that, 
independently from the medievalist traditions, with a clear focus on modern 
history and starting with Barrington Moore and Theda Skocpol in the 1950s, 
would become decisive for these new trends in medieval history.69 The key 
figure in this respect was the aforementioned Charles Tilly. Tilly saw state-
building first of all as a competitive struggle, both between polities and within 
their territory, in which some contenders obtained victory and other ones lost. 
Tilly’s influence was very important but it cannot be said that Tilly’s first major 
contribution to the debate stopped more traditional Western medievalists 
from continuing to use less theoretically informed categories of state and 
state-building. In his first major contributions to the debate in 1975, Tilly ar-
gued that the modern state essentially developed within a dialectical interplay 
with ‘war’ and ‘taxes’ as the two core elements. Charles Tilly had come to this 
simple but brilliant and still very appealing hypothesis by building upon an 
impressive wave of historical-sociological work during the first decades after 
World War ii. At least some of this work, mostly appearing in the format of 
grand narratives, deserves to be introduced here before explaining how Tilly 
further developed his paradigm.
Thinkers like Moore, Skocpol and Tilly himself wrote very grand narratives, 
on states and revolution, and they combined Marx and Weber in very appealing 
ways according to the dominant structuralist and large-scale comparative para-
digms of the day. But another classic historiographical debate was taking place 
at the same time: the one on ‘the transition from feudalism to capitalism’ which 
was rather an internal-Marxist discussion but also brought in some Smithian 
68 Bulst and Genet, La ville, la bourgeoisie et la genèse de l’état moderne; Blockmans and Gen-
et, The Origins of the Modern State.
69 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship; Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
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elements.70 Perry Anderson is another authority in the field who took up a spe-
cifically Marxist position in the state formation discussion by writing two very 
readable and eclectic books. In these he tried to link the transition from one 
‘mode of production’ (or according to him rather a genuinely existing ‘social 
formation’) into another with the specific ‘superstructural’ forms of domination 
and authority.71 Finally, as a later offshoot of this branch of grand narratives in 
historical sociology, there was Michael Mann’s ‘Sources of Social Power’. This 
new Weberian approach to multicausality in historical developments, howev-
er, seems to have come too late to still be influential, as by the late eighties 
poststructuralism and postcolonial theories were rapidly gaining ground. Al-
though like Anderson’s work, this approach originally departed from Engels’ 
famous phrase on the “relative autonomy of the state”, Mann’s model never 
seemed to inspire the more empirically oriented historians in the strict sense 
in the same way as Tilly’s one, which was institutionally propagated by Block-
mans and Genet. In general, however, both the more classical Marxist ap-
proaches and Mann’s work start from the extra-economic appropriation of 
surplus, whereas the more Weberian-inspired historical sociologists were also 
very preoccupied with the question of legitimate forms of domination.
Another notable influence on Tilly and his generation was the work of yet 
another student of Max Weber: the sociologist Norbert Elias. His Civilizing 
Process, written in 1939 but only receiving real attention from the 1960s on-
wards, considered the state formation process in terms of growing networks 
of interdependency.72 Elias’ work put networks of clientage and patronage, 
and notably those in which the nobility and other state elites were involved, 
strongly on the agenda, so that historians working under his influence again 
mainly made use of the prosopographical method. Questions like the relations 
between local and central elites, and the role of factions and party struggle 
within state formation were often studied, making implicit or explicit use of 
Elias’ insights.73
But Elias’ impact on the discussion was rather short-lived and it was Tilly’s 
paradigm that would remain exerting the strongest influence. In his most ma-
ture definition of 1990, Charles Tilly defined states as “coercion-wielding orga-
nizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise 
clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial 
territories”. This definition includes “city states, empires and many other forms 
70 Sweezy, The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism.
71 Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State.
72 Elias, The Civilizing Process.
73 Blockmans, “Patronage, Brokerage and Corruption”.
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of government, but excludes tribes, lineages, firms and churches”. Tilly made 
further distinctions between “national states” as “states governing multiple 
contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated and 
autonomous structures” and “nation states” as states “whose people share a 
strong linguistic, religious and symbolic identity”.74 Thus, Tilly’s ‘national state’ 
is an ideal type close to Weber’s bureaucratic form of legitimacy.
The influences of Strayer and Hintze were also present in the above- 
mentioned multi-volume series of books directed by Genet and Blockmans.75 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, a series of conferences was organized on the topic, 
first in France and later on a European level. The focus here was on the ‘genèse 
de l’État moderne’, during which various specialists empirically and theoreti-
cally discussed aspects of state building. These included the role of burghers, 
aristocrats and state officials, usually informed by the prosopographical meth-
od which became ever more popular as an innovative way to study institutions 
from the social point of view. These aspects furthermore also included the im-
portance of finance and taxation, the influence of culture and ideology and the 
relationship between ‘Church and State’.76 We can summarize the fundamen-
tal grand narrative presented by the two medievalists as follows. Between c. 
1280 and c. 1360 the development of ‘modern states’ in Europe was determined 
by the interplay of the two main Tillyan factors of ‘War’ and ‘Taxation’. In other 
words: states developed in their ‘modern’ form within a dialectics between 
centralized surplus extraction and state building through military expenses. 
Taxes were needed to build armies and armies were needed to defend the state 
from both external and internal threats, namely foreign predators and revolts. 
This process developed an internal logic which further stimulated the devel-
opment of centralized judicial, fiscal-financial, administrative and military 
institutions, institutions which over time developed their own ‘relative auton-
omy’ and gave birth to a professional class of state servants with ‘bureaucratic’ 
characteristics. The bureaucrats then diffused a proper form of ‘state ideology’ 
that served their own interests as well as those of the state over ‘localist’, ‘patri-
monial’ or ‘feudal’ interests. The modern state thus succeeded in exercising 
ever more control on its subjects and territory and in mobilizing ever more 
men and means in its efforts to further centralize, and this became a self- 
perpetuating process, although it was often also kept in check by parliamen-
tary institutions, urban revolts or attempts by aristocrats and state officials to 
re-appropriate elements of public power for themselves. Thus, in this narrative 
74 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, pp. 1–2 (see also fn. 5).
75 Genet, “L’État moderne: un modèle opératoire”.
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the state, its institutions and its officer class are to some degree ‘superposed’ 
and to some degree ‘integrated’ in local societies or communities, in the inter-
play between centrifugal and centripetal social and political forces. The spe-
cific institutional shape which this process took resulted in what is now ever 
more termed a ‘path dependency’, a structural inertia of development able to 
determine the forms and functions of state formation and the adjoining fields 
of tension for centuries to come. Genet also integrated Tilly’s model into a 
broader Marxist analysis by articulating the ‘modern state’ with the feudal 
mode of production. As a result of this, ‘state feudalism’ led to an ever-greater 
share of surplus product being extra-economically appropriated, not in the 
form of classic feudal rent but as centralized taxes, to be redistributed again 
among the state elites.77
Like any other historical discussion on ‘modernity’—the same thing nota-
bly goes for ‘capitalism’—the state formation debate in studies on the medi-
eval and early modern West seems to be trapped within inevitable sets of di-
chotomies. Apart from ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’ itself, the discussion on the 
‘early modern’ or ‘modern state’ includes classical bipolar oppositions such as: 
‘centripetal’ versus ‘centrifugal’ forces, ‘bureaucracy’ versus ‘patrimonialism’ or 
‘feudalism’ (or, with an East-West opposition added to it, ‘sultanism’), ‘state’ 
versus ‘cities’ or ‘local communities’, ‘conflict’ versus ‘harmony’, ‘community’ or 
‘integration’, ‘the elite’ or ‘ruling class’ versus ‘the people’ etc. One can perhaps 
also add to this analytical canon of bipolar oppositions Ibn Khaldun’s afore-
mentioned tension between the dynastic and urban elements on the one hand 
and the nomadic and pastoral ones on the other. There now seems to be a 
quasi-general consensus among scholars studying state formation on the rele-
vance of all of these oppositions.
Moreover, since the 1990s, it seems that Charles Tilly has successfully man-
aged to add to the mix a new fundamental scheme of interpretation which is 
also constructed in a bipolar manner, namely his analytical distinction be-
tween ‘capital’ and ‘coercion’ within paths of development. In his last work on 
state formation, published in 1990, apart from a “coercion-intensive” path of 
state formation, Tilly also distinguished a more “capital-intensive” possibility. 
Basically, ‘coercion’ means ‘the state’ while ‘capital’ means ‘the city’. Tilly de-
fines capital very broadly as “any tangible mobile resources, and enforceable 
claims on such resources”.78 According to Tilly’s further explanation, in a vol-
ume published in 1994, “cities shape the destinies of states chiefly by serving as 
77 Genet,“Féodalisme et naissance de l’état moderne”.
78 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 17.
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containers and distributing points of capital”.79 In the same volume Blockmans 
nuances this by stressing the importance of “bottom-up movements” contrib-
uting to the outcome of power struggles, at least in areas of “high urban den-
sity” although his main emphasis also remains a fiscal and commercial one.80 
More generally, in his brief account of the Burgundian state, the  aforementioned 
historical sociologist Michael Mann also has the tendency to reduce cities to 
their economic role and does not really consider them as socio-political com-
munities. He also fails to take into account other types of communities such as 
villages and corporate groups. Moreover, the role of the state elites is almost 
never discussed in terms of the urban background which many of them shared, 
even if only in education or culture. They are mostly considered either as doc-
ile servants of the state or as intermediaries in negotiating for it with the local 
communities. Thus, in the mainstream narratives on state formation, notwith-
standing the work of Blockmans, Blickle and others, the city still has no real 
‘agency’ except as a source of capital and perhaps as home to some elites who 
will join the state apparatus. Even in the Italian ‘city-states’, proper state forma-
tion is only recognized as soon as a city tightened its grip on the contado, the 
surrounding countryside which it exploited, and thus stopped being a com-
mune and instead became a territorial principality, a signoria.81
But can the city really be merely considered as a source of ‘capital’ as it is in 
Tilly’s model (note that he uses the term very broadly in the sense of material 
resources and not in a Marxist way). Tilly’s logic of state formation fundamen-
tally considers flow from the bottom to the top of material resources (by way of 
taxing the subjects) and men (soldiers). Of course, how could it be denied that 
these surplus flows were necessary for the building of any kind of state struc-
ture? And this then becomes the grid of analysis which Tilly uses to distinguish 
between forms of state formation which are ‘coercion intensive’ (e.g. Tsarist 
Russia) and ‘capital intensive’ (e.g. the Netherlands). Although Blockmans and 
Genet had also always placed much weight on the factors of ‘negotiation’ with 
local and regional political communities and the ‘political society’ of the elites, 
in the model they shared with Tilly, the autonomous agency of these local com-
munities and the proper interests of these emerging state elites somewhat dis-
appear. As a result, another line of thought in sociology seems to have been 
slightly obscured during the last decades of the hegemony of Tilly, Genet and 
Blockmans (although the latter two certainly never entirely lost sight of it). This 
line goes from Otto von Gierke’s ‘Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht’ to Walter 
79 Tilly and Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, p. 8.
80 Tilly and Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, p. 225.
81 Chittolini, La formazione dello Stato regionale.
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 Ullmann’s ‘ascending theory of power’ and Peter Blickle’s ‘Kommunalismus’.82 
Leaving aside all the nuances in theory and formulation, one might say that 
this is a tradition which emphasizes the idea of a state formation ‘from below’ 
more than the rather top-down model of the centralizing and coercive state 
hungry for war and taxes and the full administrative control over its inhabit-
ants. Again, it must be said that Genet and certainly Blockmans also acknowl-
edged this bottom-up tradition, given that one of the volumes of ‘The Origins 
of the Modern State’ was edited by Peter Blickle. Moreover, in the Belgian school 
of medievalists there was also certainly a tradition, starting with Henri Pi-
renne, of considering state formation to emerge from the tension between ‘the 
state’ and ‘the city’, especially during the ‘Burgundian’ fifteenth century. Never-
theless, it seems that this tradition of state formation ‘from below’ continues to 
represent a largely neglected, and at the same time highly promising, 
paradigm.
Current work in the field offers a pluralism in theoretical approaches that is 
not easily summarized here. Recently, Lecuppre-Desjardin even returned to a 
Brunnerian point of view of a composite principality based on local customary 
and political traditions and on personal relations, warning about an all too 
easy use of the term ‘state’ in the Burgundian context.83 For the aforemen-
tioned John Watts the structures of government and the shared patterns of 
political life that were already in place were reinforced during the fourteenth 
and fifteenth century exactly because of war and crisis. Watts emphasizes not 
only that the state saw its power and authority rising but also that we must 
take into account the role played by smaller political structures such as cities 
and lordships, other institutions like the Church or guilds, networks of patron-
age and vassalage, as well as ideological discourse. At the same time, he also 
suggests that developments in taxation, law and justice are still central to 
state-building.84
Thus, for over a century now the issue of the state and its development has 
been, and continues to be, a prominent one for both empirically oriented his-
torians and sociological model building within scholarship of the later medi-
eval and early modern state in Europe. As will be detailed below, however, 
these occasionally fierce debates on the state’s uses and conceptualizations do 
not really have any similarly impactful counterparts in the study of fifteenth-
century Islamic West-Asia.
82 Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought; Blickle, Kommunalismus.
83 Lecuppre-Desjardin, Le royaume inachevé.
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Jan Dumolyn and Jo Van Steenbergen - 9789004431317
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 02:28:41PM
via free access
115Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
3 Studying State Formation in Fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia
Empirical studies engaging with questions of ‘the state’ in late medieval, and 
especially fifteenth-century, Islamic West-Asia are as unwieldy and diverse as is 
true for late medieval Europe. Research on the region has long been dominated 
by dynastic historiography, and this continues to be the case. As such, all types 
of empirical studies in the field have always situated themselves one way or 
another within the statist frameworks of Ottoman and Timurid family rule, of 
Turkmen nomadic leaderships, and of the Sultanate of Cairo and its central 
power elites of mamlūk origins. As with the above survey of work on Europe, 
therefore, for the study of West-Asia it would be also impossible to do more 
than take stock of dominant historiographical trends as these have defined 
these distinct dynastic traditions.
These trends, however, do not just all share a more or less explicitly dynastic 
understanding of social and cultural realities, including of political organiza-
tion, dividing the field into three separate research traditions of Mamlukolo-
gists, (early) Ottomanists and specialists of Turkmen and Timurid history. As 
will be further explained below, many, if not most, of these historians of late 
medieval Islamic West-Asia also share a lack of any explicit concern with more 
theoretical reflections on that political organization, meaning that assump-
tions about its statist appearances tend to be taken for granted rather than ex-
plained. With a handful of notable exceptions, defining the concept and heu-
ristic meanings of state formation was never really a priority within mainstream 
historiography of late medieval Islamic West-Asia. It is therefore not straight-
forward to describe those dominant historiographical trends, many of which 
we have to reconstruct from implicit assumptions rather than from explicit 
choices and arguments. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the (dynastic) state has 
been significant in the historiography of late medieval Islamic West-Asia, 
meaning that it is certainly useful to provide a general reconstruction of how 
the state actually mattered, if only to uncover how also here Marxist and, espe-
cially, Weberian readings of resource accumulation, war-making and state-
making have left their traces. Before engaging with particular contributions 
and ideas in each of the three dynastic research traditions, we will therefore 
first provide a general outline of the wider frameworks that informed all three 
traditions and that appear to have coalesced around Weber’s concepts of ei-
ther traditional or, especially, legal authority.
3.1 The Dominance of Legalistic Readings and the Sociological Turns of 
Lapidus, Hodgson and Chamberlain
As noted earlier in this chapter, the history of state studies in general has been 
marred by an analytical dichotomy between legalistic and sociological 
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approaches. At least, this somewhat reductive legalistic versus sociological 
framing seems very useful to organize and understand how the state has been 
considered in the different dynastic historiographies of West-Asia. In fact, with-
in these historiographies there is an interesting prevalence of the former, legal-
istic, frame. This is largely due to the fact that within these historiographical 
traditions there has always been a strong presence of Islamicists and modern 
specialists of Islam. These scholars have always been primarily interested in the 
formation of Islam as a normative cultural, social and political practice and have 
always tended to see the history of Sunni Islam’s legal system as one of the crucial 
vectors of this formative process. This Islamicist focus means that for a long 
time, understandings of political organization in Islamic West-Asia have been 
considered first and foremost from a legal perspective of formal procedures, 
structures and discourses that were somehow related to the implementation of 
God’s Law (shariʿa). Contemporary writings and related sources in Arabic and 
Persian certainly lend themselves easily to these legalistic interpretations. This 
is not just because of the legal training and employment shared by most of their 
authors, but also because of the prescriptive, normative and legitimating agen-
das that these texts all served. At the same time this legalistic frame was also in-
formed by particular modern narratives of Asian otherness and of an Islamic 
state formation process that was considered fundamentally different from the 
secular and liberal destiny of the West. The notion of the absolutist rule of divine 
law and of legal conservatism offered a highly functional framework which 
many modern scholars have used to explain the post-Abbasid Islamic world’s 
absorption of Inner Asian nomadic conquerors and the maladroit condomini-
um between violence-wielding Turko-Mongol ‘outsiders’ and that world’s so-
phisticated urban elites, especially its religious scholars and judges as well as the 
caliphs of Baghdad and, eventually, Cairo.85
In the early 1990s the Ottomanist Rifa’at ʿAli Abou-El-Haj heavily criticized 
this traditional reading of the state which had also for a long time permeat-
ed early modern Ottoman studies. In fact, in a programmatic publication on 
the study of Ottoman state formation he usefully summarized the basic— 
a-historical and absolutist—assumptions of this legalistic trend in scholarship. 
On the one hand, Abou-El-Haj lamented the fact that “in twentieth century 
scholarly writing on Ottoman affairs, the concept, the institution, and the na-
ture of the state have been treated as if, regardless of the passage of time, the 
state had remained essentially the same”. On the other hand, he claims that 
85 Representative and, at the same time, constitutive examples of this particular legalistic 
trend are Tyan, Institutions du droit public musulman; Schimmel, “Kalif und Kadi im spät-
mittelalterlichen Ägypten”; Lambton, State and Government in medieval Islam.
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modern West-Asian scholarship is predisposed “to regard the modern nation-
state with its meritocratic bureaucracy as a paradigm”, so that “modern socio-
logically evolved standards as merit, public service, equity, and rationalized 
practices” tend to be used to “measure the early modern Ottoman state”. For 
Abou-El-Haj this perspective derives from “the misapprehension that prior 
to the seventeenth century the Ottoman state was a centralized, efficient, 
and rational public entity, unique in the period during which it flourished”.86  
In Abou-El-Haj’s reading these are highly problematic assumptions of pre- 
seventeenth century Ottoman meritocratic maximalism and uniqueness. In 
fact, these assumptions have for a long time been constituent partners of the 
legalistic trend in general. In this dominant reading the idea, or the ideal, of 
the state as a continuous and autonomous constitutionalist bureaucracy actu-
ally served as an interpretative norm against which historians were supposed 
to weigh the course of state formation in post-Abbasid West-Asian history writ 
large, as if the whole was meant to culminate in Ottoman absolutism.
The field of Islamic West-Asian political history continues to be easily lured 
by the clear-cut categories and well-trodden narratives of legalistic readings. 
Starting in the middle of the twentieth century, however, there also emerged 
more sociologically inspired approaches to political organization and state for-
mation in later medieval Islamic West-Asia. For a long time, such develop-
ments mostly happened in the margins of the field and its legalistic readings, 
and it has to be acknowledged that the pioneering beginnings of this alterna-
tive, sociological approach arguably lie in assumptions of the growing irrele-
vance of traditional statist structures in the face of Turko-Mongol irruption. 
This overture therefore engaged with a search for alternative conceptualiza-
tions of power and its organization in response to a presumed ineptness or 
even failure of the continuing legalistic state and its bureaucratic apparatus of 
power. The basic ingredients that were proposed to solve this analytical irrele-
vance of the legalistic state were Weberian traditional authority and the mili-
tary household and family rule, patronage and mostly urban institutions for 
the local management and organization of resource flows. There are three pio-
neering contributions to this critical sociological turn in Islamic state forma-
tion studies that deserve to be expanded upon more explicitly. First and fore-
most, there are the writings of Ira Lapidus and Marshall Hodgson which are 
particular products of mid-twentieth century structuralism and systems the-
ory. They fused the dominant legalistic reading of the state in Islamic West-
Asian studies with a search for alternatives in highly creative and influential 
ways. Alongside these two authors we will also consider here the writings of 
86 Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State, pp. 8, 9, 10.
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Michael Chamberlain, as they represent an important translation of the ideas 
of Lapidus and Hodgson to late twentieth century post-structuralism and also 
as Chamberlain was arguably the first to truly think without the traditional 
legalistic paradigm.
Ira Lapidus, in his Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages, argued that the 
locus of power in the urban centers of late medieval Egypt and Syria no longer 
lay with the state. Indeed, here he still conceptualized the state in a legalistic 
fashion as the central bureaucratic apparatus that organized these centers’ 
protection and exploitation. Due to what Lapidus defined as “the privatization 
of power”, power instead lay with the capacities of the state’s agents to engage 
in mutually beneficial informal relations of patronage and service beyond trib-
utary and military needs. These agents were military commanders (“the Mam-
luks”) with their expansive urban households and religious scholars (“the Ula-
ma”), who were quasi-integrated in the state apparatus and simultaneously 
endowed with ambitious urban communal roles. Lapidus explained that he 
was “drawing on the work of Weber, Parsons, and other students of social pro-
cess” and following the systemic readings by these theorists he proposed that 
“the Political System” was not confined to the state, but joined “the Mamluk 
State and the Urban Notables” in the balancing act of “a governing condomin-
ium” which boiled down to “a shared control over the society”. More specifi-
cally, this meant that
while the Mamluks took up the massive economic and military responsi-
bilities, the notables lent their intimate grasp of local affairs to the service 
of the state and coordinated the government of society at more intricate 
levels. Their original social importance made them indispensable auxilia-
ries of the Mamluk state apparatus, and in turn their partial assimilation 
to the regime served to validate their local status and to assure their suc-
cess in communal roles.87
Marshall Hodgson (1922–1968) is best known for his magisterial, posthumously 
published three-volume The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World 
Civilisation. In this total history of Islamic societies and cultures Hodgson was 
certainly more explicitly concerned with processes of political transformation 
than his younger colleague Lapidus in Muslim Cities. At the same time, even 
though also indebted to the predominance of systems theory in post-World 
War ii times, Hodgson’s writings were less theoretically grounded than Lapi-
dus’ work. Nevertheless, Hodgson’s particular conceptualizations of time, 
87 Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages, quotes pp. viii, 116.
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space and phenomena pertaining to the longue durée of Islamic history were 
no less compelling or influential. This is also apparent from Lapidus’ later mag-
num opus of similar ambition A History of Islamic Societies (1988). Lapidus’ dis-
cussion in that book of “the Post-ʿAbbasid Concept of the State” concludes, in 
a very Hodgsonian ‘historicization’ and ‘nomadization’ of his above-mentioned 
understanding of the state and wider ‘political system’, that
between 950 and 1500, a region-wide pattern of governmental institu-
tions took shape. These institutions began with the late ʿAbbasid practice 
of the caliphate, the use of slave military forces and iqtaʿ forms of tax 
administration, and nomadic concepts of family and state authority. This 
new order first took shape in the eastern provinces of the former ʿAbbasid 
Empire under the aegis of the Buwayhids, the Ghaznavids, and the early 
Saljuqs.88
For Hodgson, as for Lapidus, the locus of power in what Hodgson termed ‘the 
Middle Periods’ (1000–1500 ce) had actually shifted towards specific social ac-
tors, in a double process defined as ‘militarization’ and ‘unitary contractual-
ism’. In this process military amirs and urban notables (aʿyan) primarily pur-
sued personal interests and responsibilities in mutual relationships that 
“amounted sometimes to a relation of personal patronage—a type of relation 
that played a major role in such a society”. In this egalitarian context, authority 
did not simply derive from any impersonal state apparatus, but was an achieve-
ment of personal relationships. These empowering bonds appeared in the for-
mat of contract-like arrangements that subscribed to a uniform communal 
framework of obligations and expectations, mainly though not exclusively in-
formed by divine law (Shariʿa). Alluding to Weber’s aforementioned defini-
tions of legitimate authority and its three ideal types as well as to Weber’s idea 
of the state as a monopolist of legitimate physical coercion, Hodgson formu-
lated this ‘medieval’ empowerment of society, as a Muslim community, as 
follows:
Whether an independent position of authority was legitimized by appeal 
to personal charisma or to explicit law or to custom, it was conceived as 
established by mutual agreement and as assuming mutual obligations 
between one individual and others. […] always it was a contract-type ar-
rangement which had to be renewed personally with each new holder of 
authority and was properly binding only on those who had personally 
88 Lapidus, Islamic Societies to the Nineteenth Century, pp. 262.
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accepted it. […] The religious community was […] almost—though not 
quite—liberated from dependence on an agrarian-based state; so that its 
communal law, built on its communal presuppositions, and not that of 
any territorial state, assumed the persisting primacy that accrues to what-
ever possesses exclusive legitimacy. It was not quite liberated: the ulti-
mate sanction of force remained critical, and was left in the hands of the 
state. But the role of the state was as far reduced, especially in the basic 
sphere of law, as it ever has been in citied high culture.89
For Hodgson this ‘communal’ empowerment was part and parcel of a historical 
process of state-society polarization that involved “the collapse of the caliphal 
state and its bureaucracy”. This led to the subsequent difficulty “to develop any 
really integrated states”, and the formation—especially in the wake of the 
Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century—of new “military constructions”. 
Despite moments of brilliance, time and again these constructions “failed to 
provide sufficient strength to self-perpetuating bureaucracies which would 
have assured a continuity of authority despite the personality of the amir, and 
often failed to go far beyond a purely tribal, essentially irresponsible notion of 
power, in which the whole land became the proper prey of the prowess of a 
vigorous tribe”.90
Hodgson was trying to come to terms here with the Middle Periods’ histori-
cal context of short-lived military state formations constructed around politi-
cal patterns informed by nomadism, Turko-Mongol ideas and ideals of power, 
and Inner Asian steppe life. For this context, Hodgson actually developed his 
own statist model parallel to Lapidus’ “governing condominium”, to under-
stand how these patterns also included a “nomad-urban symbiosis” which 
eventually, in early modern times, helped to overcome the structural problem 
of failing political integration and insufficient bureaucratic power. This be-
came the highly influential model of the ‘military patronage state’, in which 
“the steppe principles of nomad patronage of urban culture were generalized”, 
and which, for Hodgson, had a particular, historical effect on processes of state 
formation in late medieval and early modern Islamic West-Asia. In his reading 
of these patterns and processes, the state-society scales were again tipped in 
favor of the state, which thus gradually re-appeared as an absolutist legal struc-
ture and an institutional apparatus of centralizing power. Hodgson summa-
rized this model and its evolutionary process as follows:
89 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 348, 349–350.
90 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 398, 400, 404.
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The Mongol states did, nevertheless, introduce the notions characteriz-
ing the ‘military patronage state’, which was to have a great future; and in 
doing so they modified the context of the Muslim institutions. Already in 
central Eurasia itself, the nomad-urban symbiosis had been raised above 
the level of simple plundering exploitation. In the agrarian societies of 
Islamdom, under the impulse of the tremendous successes of the Mon-
gols and of the Turkic tribes that had shared their victories, the symbiosis 
was raised to a yet higher level. The Mongols from the first acted in a 
spirit of monumental achievement: they destroyed in the grand manner, 
they built in the grand manner too. All this had a relatively enduring in-
stitutional residue which we may pinpoint under three heads, recalling, 
however, that no one state is being described, but only features that fre-
quently did occur under the Mongols and among their heirs, and that 
show mutual relevance. First, a legitimation of independent dynastic 
law; second, the conception of the whole state as a single military force; 
third, the attempt to exploit all economic and high-cultural resources as 
appanages of the chief military families. However, most of these institu-
tional tendencies merely had their beginnings in Mongol times, which 
still displayed much continuity with the Earlier Middle Period; some 
were not developed fully till the sixteenth century, when the use of gun-
powder weapons had given the central states (and the patterns they em-
bodied) much more power.91
Hodgson’s model of the ‘military patronage state’92 conceived of the state as a 
rudimentary military apparatus of violence and exploitation that pursued le-
gitimate authority and local connectivity via its leading military families’ pa-
tronage of cultural elites and resources. It was applied as an interpretive tool in 
his detailed historical survey of the Middle Periods, where he built upon much 
extant historiographical scholarship to also engage with ‘medieval’ polities 
such as those of the fifteenth century. In the case of so-called Mamluk Cairo, 
Hodgson especially stressed the military element and the total exclusion of 
non-military society from an institutionalized type of absolutist power that he 
identified as oligarchic and as qualified by “chivalry” and “incessant intestine 
fights”.93 In the Timurid case, Hodgson preferred to highlight the factor of cul-
tural patronage, explaining that “in the field of the arts the Timurids illustrate 
91 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 405–406.
92 See also Crossley, “Military Patronage and Hodgson’s Genealogy of State Centralization”, 
esp. pp. 103–108 (‘What was the Military Patronage State?’).
93 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 417–419.
Jan Dumolyn and Jo Van Steenbergen - 9789004431317
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 02:28:41PM
via free access
Dumolyn and Van Steenbergen122
<UN>
the patronage state at its best”. This was despite—or rather thanks to—the fact 
that “the chronicle of the Timurid reigns is even fuller of fratricide and power 
lust and low intrigue than is most Muslim history in the Middle Periods”.94 As 
for the Ottomans, they appear in Hodgson’s writings as combining the best of 
these two worlds: absolutist military states marred by internecine warfare 
combined with local societies blessed by a flowering of, especially, Persianate 
culture. The fact that the Ottoman polity was “founded in ghazi traditions rath-
er than steppe traditions” meant according to Hodgson that it was organized 
more coherently around the Ottoman family, its ghazis or frontier warriors, 
and the many resources that the Muslim-Christian frontier had to offer.95 For 
Hodgson the mid-fifteenth-century conquest of Istanbul boosted this solid 
and integrated dynastic and military core to an imperial level, so that “from a 
frontier ghazi state, [it] became an absolutism assimilable to the military pa-
tronage type, and one of the cultural foci of Islamdom”.96 Eventually, in Hodg-
son’s reading, an absolutist centralizing state arose around the Ottoman court 
that integrated a wide diversity of social elites, practices and ideas into its sta-
bilized military structures. In Hodgson’s own words, this culminated in “an ab-
solutism in which the whole government—even the imâms of the mosques, as 
governmental appointees—were regarded as military (’askerî) even though 
not as ‘men of the sword’ (sayfî); and all that was valuable in society at large 
was regarded as in the dispensation of the royal family and its servants”.97
Michael Chamberlain is another historian of Islamic West-Asia who  deserves 
to be mentioned in this overview of the sociological turn in West-Asian studies, 
despite the fact that he did not engage with the fifteenth century. In fact, Cham-
berlain is one of the very few scholars who have engaged with the work of both 
Lapidus and Hodgson and who also thought about the concept of the state. 
This was done in his work on the organization of elite life in thirteenth- and 
fourteenth-century Damascus and in two later surveys of West-Asian power 
politics between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries.98 Chamberlain’s think-
ing about political organization followed that of his teacher Ira Lapidus in 
particular in being very consciously and critically informed by contemporary 
sociological theory. In Chamberlain’s case, however, this involved late twentieth- 
century post-structuralism rather than systems theory and functionalism.99 As 
94 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 490–493 (quotes pp. 490, 493).
95 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, p. 427.
96 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, p. 559.
97 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 562–563.
98 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice; Chamberlain, “Ayyūbid dynasty”; Chamber-
lain, “Military Patronage States”.
99 See on this Clifford, “Ubi Sumus?”.
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a result, Chamberlain arguably emerges as the most successful representative 
of this sociologically inspired trend in West-Asian historiography, since unlike 
Lapidus and Hodgson he was not seduced by the structuralist categories of 
the dominant legalistic tradition. Chamberlain actually managed to entirely 
break with that tradition’s evolutionary Hegelianism, freeing himself from the 
recurrent maximalist interpretations of the state in legalistic readings. He was 
able to think beyond the strict Orientalist categories of a state-(civil) society 
relationship that should be measured in bipolar terms of strength or weak-
ness, or of the state’s failure, or not, to integrate society.100 Basically, Cham-
berlain rethought the latter issue that had also haunted Lapidus and Hodgson, 
namely the relationship between the legalistic appearances of the state and 
the actual locus of power in ‘the Middle Periods’: military and other, especially 
urban strongmen and their kin groups or households. Whereas the two other 
scholars thought about the changing quality of that relationship in terms of 
“privatization” (Lapidus) or of “militarization” (Hodgson), Chamberlain radi-
cally questioned the validity of this entire relational construct. He actually 
moved away from the idea of society’s ‘subalternity’ and disruptive ‘medieval’ 
empowerment to that of the priority of social practice and the state as a fluid 
and messy by-product of that practice. This analytical reversal followed the 
ideas of Norbert Elias and, especially, Pierre Bourdieu, to favor social practice 
and power as a social phenomenon and moved against the idea of the state as 
a metahistorical bureaucratic actor. Chamberlain develops this approach most 
forcefully, and as a tacit correction to Lapidus, in Knowledge and Social Prac-
tice. Here, he is very explicit about his highly critical and minimalist thinking 
about the state as a historical concept, explaining that
The state in this period was not an impersonal entity, possessing special-
ized agencies, capable of formulating long-term strategies to pursue po-
litical goals. The politics of the city consisted of continuously renegoti-
ated relationships among the ruling household, the important amīrs and 
their households, and civilian elites with specialized knowledge or reli-
gious prestige. If we are to speak of the state at all, it is as an abstraction 
of the personal ties of alliance, dependence, and dominance among 
these three groups. Rather than look for the mechanisms by which the 
state, as the primary embodiment and agent of power, diffused power 
from the top down, we need to understand a more complex situation. 
Studies of the bureaucracy, of such entities as the sultanate and the ca-
liphate, of the legal and ‘public’ aspects of power, are undeniably useful 
100 See on the Orientalism of these state-society polarities, Sadowski, “New Orientalism”.
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in themselves. These, however, do not cover the entirety, or even perhaps 
the most important part, of relations among power, cultural practices, 
and the social strategies of groups. Such approaches have been useful in 
medieval Islamic history only with so much qualification that they lose 
the very precision they are intended to introduce.101
In Knowledge and Social Practice Chamberlain defined the pattern of power 
relationships that emerges from this analytical turn to urban practice as “a 
kind of maladroit patrimonialism”, and it was through this pattern of personal 
ties rather than through any state structure that “Ayyūbid and Mamlūk warrior 
households […] made political use of existing social, cultural and administra-
tive practices”.102 In two subsequent studies, Chamberlain further qualified this 
correction of Lapidus’ functionalist universe through the notion of “maladroit 
patrimonialism” by bringing in the Hodgsonian concept of “the military pa-
tronage state”. This happened as Chamberlain was expanding his historical 
 horizon beyond the narrow confines of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Da-
mascus. In so doing he was summarily following in the footsteps that had 
already led his teacher Lapidus from the Syro-Egyptian focus of his Muslim Cit-
ies to the global one of his Islamic Civilizations and its critical engagements with 
Hodgson’s conceptualizations of “the Middle Periods”. Chamberlain’s own criti-
cal engagements focused especially on how competition, conflict and related 
social practices helped to better understand Turko-Saljuq and post-Saljuq 
West-Asia as a meaningfully connected political space. In making this argu-
ment, Chamberlain simultaneously expanded the horizon of the concept of a 
‘military patronage state’ beyond the spatial and temporal (and structuralist) 
confines of Hodgson’s Mongol and post-Mongol uses. In his contribution to the 
Cambridge History of Egypt, published in 1998, Chamberlain described how at 
the time of the late twelfth-century Ayyubids, Egypt also came to share “a num-
ber of characteristics with […] the post-Saljuk Muslim military patronage 
states”. This meant that “political power was concentrated in, and emanated 
from, the household (bayt)” and that “its political economy was marked by a 
relatively weak bureaucracy and ruling establishment, partial control of land 
revenue by horse warriors and religious leaders, indirect rule through religious 
and military magnates, and parcelized and derived sovereignties”.103 His chap-
ter “Military Patronage States and the Political Economy of the Frontier, 1000–
1250”, first published in 2005, subsequently engaged along similar, practical 
101 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, pp. 60.
102 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice, pp. 60.
103 Chamberlain, “Ayyūbid dynasty”, pp. 238, 241.
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lines with these post-Saljuq military patronage states in Islamic West-Asia, and 
with their Saljuq predecessors. In fact, that chapter explained even more clearly 
Chamberlain’s explicitly non-legalistic understanding of Hodgson’s ‘military 
patronage state’, as he insisted on the fact “that we should not think of the 
Seljuks as a unitary state, but rather as a collection of powerful households 
kept in check by the head of the most powerful among them”. He furthermore 
also refined his own earlier minimalist understanding of the state as a so-called 
‘abstraction’ of particular social relationships, claiming that “the ruling house-
hold’s adoption of monarchical and legal arguments for legitimate authority 
was one way of fending off the claims of the other households within the rul-
ing family”.104 Chamberlain thus argued that rather than simply being margin-
alized or regularly broken by social practice’s key features of competition and 
struggle for power (as in a way Lapidus and Hodgson had suggested), the legal-
istic state was actually reproduced by those features. Like the aforementioned 
Charles Tilly, Chamberlain thus also believed that “war made the state and the 
state made war”. For Chamberlain at least, the state did so in highly minimalist 
ways, as an empowering set of ideas of legitimate political order and sover-
eignty that was part of the tools that were strategically deployed by powerful 
competing households. “The military patronage state”, Chamberlain con-
cludes, “thus permitted the ideal of the universal cosmopolitan empire to sur-
vive within a political-economic context that tended towards fragmentation”.105
It remains difficult to gauge the actual impact of these more sociologically 
inspired approaches of Lapidus and Hodgson, and more recently of Cham-
berlain, on the different dynastic historiographies of post-Temür West-Asia. 
A recent survey article of Syro-Egyptian social history identified the enormous 
impact of Lapidus’ Muslim Cities in redirecting the field towards the study of 
informal social networks, urban elites and social equilibrium. At the same 
time, this survey acknowledged that there has been a lack of critical engage-
ment with Lapidus’ systemic thinking. It furthermore questioned the value of 
Chamberlain’s contribution in this respect, claiming that “Chamberlain’s Da-
mascus is ‘no longer a society’, but only a space for elite struggles, and therefore 
an unsatisfactory model of social action”.106 Even though the latter assessment 
104 Chamberlain, “Military Patronage States”, p. 142.
105 Chamberlain, “Military Patronage States”, p. 152.
106 Rapoport, “New Directions”, p. 144; Rapoport took the ‘no longer a society’ quote from 
Clifford, but framed it in a far more one-dimensional reading than implied by Clifford, 
who here was mainly comparing Chamberlain’s to Lapidus’ notions of ‘society’. Clifford 
actually explained that for Chamberlain “Damascus, in effect, is no longer a society—the 
locus of social cooperation—merely a social space dedicated to unlimited ‘struggle for 
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is certainly too harsh, especially as far as the invigorating impact of Chamber-
lain on the study of Islamic knowledge practices and their practitioners is con-
cerned, it is undoubtedly true that scholars today have tended to  easily take for 
granted Lapidus’, and also Chamberlain’s, more general theoretical concerns, 
or even have forgotten them, whenever their more specific analytical tools 
were deployed in contemporary research. This observation of theoretical qui-
etism regarding the state is certainly also valid for many more understandings 
of fifteenth-century West-Asian state formation, even those that do not engage 
with Lapidus or Chamberlain at all. Mostly unwittingly, uncritical legalistic 
readings of the state have arguably remained the norm, not just in modern 
Syro-Egyptian historiography, but—as Abou-El-Haj suggested—also in work 
on the Ottoman dynasty, and to some extent even in the arguably more the-
oretically informed work on Timurid and Turkmen dispensations. As will be 
demonstrated below, in the latter dynastic contexts, and also in the Ottoman 
case, some basic organizational principles related to ideas about princely 
courts, military households and dynastic dispensations, and cultural patron-
age have certainly been around for a long time, even long before Hodgson 
modelled them as ‘military patronage states’.107 However, just as Hodgson’s 
own engagement with those ideas continued to be rooted in that legalistic 
framework, so did most of the engagements of any dynastic specialist with the 
state in fifteenth-century Islamic West-Asia. In general, such engagements have 
therefore restricted their readings of the state to a theoretical quietism that 
favors merely descriptive accounts of diverse bureaucratic institutions, meri-
tocratic practices and legal norms or of their roles in governing groups, com-
munities and resources. They have prioritized detailed empirical reconstruc-
tions of the ranks and careers of dynasts, administrators and courtiers or of 
how centripetal phenomena expanded or contracted or were reproduced. In 
short, the dominant question has always remained how states successfully—
or unsuccessfully—maximized their relations with, and their autonomy from, 
West-Asia’s societies, without genuinely contemplating the validity and impli-
cations of this type of question.108
social power and status’. And yet, Chamberlain’s observation that elite social competition 
(fitnah) was responsive to mediation seems to recognize ultimately a limitation to the 
radical contingency of social practice and strategy” (Clifford, “Ubi Sumus?” p. 60).
107 See e.g. Barthold, Ulugh-beg; Aubin, Deux sayyids; Wittek, Fürstentum Mentesche; Köprülü, 
Origins of the Ottoman Empire.
108 Representative, and/or seminal, publications in this respect are, for the fifteenth-century 
Ottomans: Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer; Inalcik, The Ottoman State; idem, The Ottoman 
Empire; Imber, The Ottoman Empire; İhsanoğlu, History of the Ottoman state; Murphey, 
Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty. For the Turkmen and Timurids: Busse, Untersuchungen 
zum islamische Kanzleiwesen; Savory, “Struggle for Supremacy”; Sümer, “Ḳara-Ḳoyunlu”; 
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In studying, or simply taking for granted, such specific issues and questions, 
many of these legalistic readings of state formation in fifteenth-century Syro-
Egyptian, Ottoman, Timurid and Turkmen contexts actually quietly adopt an 
interpretation that considers the process of the endless development of the 
state in rather structured and linear terms. Interestingly this is at odds with 
the insights which, as explained above, now appear as mainstream in both the 
long history of the theoretical study of the premodern state and the study of 
state formation in late medieval Western Europe. In their maximalist, even ab-
solutist, constitutionalism, these legalistic readings also often impose assump-
tions of what states do, or what they wish to do or should do, that go far beyond 
Tilly’s interlocking practices of exclusion, integration, reproduction and ap-
propriation. This divergence may well be a function of the West-Asian particu-
larity of these fifteenth-century contexts. At the same time, however, this may 
also be a result of the lasting impact of a particular generation of historical 
scholarship in Islamic West-Asian studies that once also made Europeanist 
readings of the state prioritize a dominant line of thinking that is identified as 
legalistic here. In any case, as seen above, when detailing the value of Cham-
berlain’s contribution, from a historical and historiographical perspective 
these interpretations and assumptions are not without their challenges. As 
Abou-El-Haj also lamented in the early 1990s about Ottoman studies, this is 
especially true when such approaches are adopted without much critical re-
flection. Nowadays any active stakeholder in fifteenth-century West-Asian 
scholarship obviously tends to readily acknowledge many of these more theo-
retical challenges and their rootedness in some resilient anachronism, or even 
in “‘the four sins’ of modernist (social) theory: reductionism […], functional-
ism […], essentialism […], and universalism […]”.109 Nevertheless, it is not easy 
to provide a constructive response, especially not when the exigencies of the 
legalistic framework continue to intervene. Making abstraction of these macro- 
historical challenges in the light of other, less arcane and more down-to-earth 
matters of scholarly interest appears therefore as an easy escape route for 
many engagements with fifteenth-century West-Asian history.
Minorsky, “Civil and Military Review”; idem, “The Aq-qoyunlu”; Roemer, “Tīmūr”; Mor-
gan, Medieval Persia, pp. 83–111. For the fifteenth-century Sultanate of Cairo see Björkman, 
Staatskanzlei; Ayalon, “Studies”; Popper, Egypt and Syria; Darrag, Barsbay; Holt, “Struc-
ture”; idem, The Age of the Crusades, pp. 178–202; idem, “Mamluk Institution”; Petry, Civil-
ian Elite; idem, Twilight of Majesty; idem, Protectors or Praetorians?; idem, Criminal Under-
world; Humphreys, “Fiscal Administration”; Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l’administration; 
idem, Délinquance et ordre social; Igarashi, Land Tenure; Meloy, “Economic Intervention”; 
Meloy, Imperial Power and Maritime Trade; Loiseau, Les Mamelouks.
109 Joyce, “The Return of History”, p. 212; quoted in Green, Houses of history, p. 297.
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However, in each of the dynastic historiographies of fifteenth-century West-
Asia there certainly also are exceptions to this general tendency of combining 
legalistic readings of the state with a kind of theoretical quietism. It is worth 
mentioning a few of these more explicit engagements with the notion of state 
formation, if only to illustrate how the trans-dynastic sensitivities found in 
Lapidus, Hodgson and Chamberlain did not operate in conceptual voids. This 
also serves to show how their more theoretically informed ideas did not go 
entirely unnoticed, or how these did have at least some counterparts in dynas-
tically oriented scholarship.
3.2 Defining Early Ottoman ‘state formation’
For Ottoman fifteenth-century history, Hodgson’s aforementioned modelling 
was very much informed by foundational debates among (early) Ottomanists 
on charismatic origins in frontier warfare, fluid identities and loyalties, and 
how early Ottoman groups transformed into something more than simple 
warbands.110 In fact Hodgson’s understanding still aptly summarizes the domi-
nant paradigm of fifteenth-century Ottoman state formation. As explained be-
fore, this is the paradigm of the rise of a centralizing state around the Ottoman 
dynastic court, which integrated an ever-wider diversity of social elites, prac-
tices and ideas into its stabilizing military structures. In recent decades, one 
important factor has been interpreted as sparking this fifteenth-century dy-
namic of centralization and integration, namely the shifting of the balance 
between the centrifugal forces of marsher lords and old power elites and cen-
tripetal forces coalescing around the Ottoman household in favor of the latter, 
especially after the conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed ii.111 For Cemal 
Kafadar, this was part of a long process of Ottoman state formation, beginning 
in the early fourteenth century, and marked by the diversity of social forces 
and the fluid and mobile relationships that define any frontier, as well as by 
the local resilience “of sedentary administrative traditions in both the Perso- 
Islamic and the Byzantine modes”.112 On the basis of a critical reading of the 
ideological and narrative agendas of extant contemporary sources, Kafadar 
chose to understand this process as that of “a coalition of various forces, some 
of which were eventually driven to drop out of the enterprise or subdued or 
marginalized”. He concluded that this interaction of centripetal and  centrifugal 
110 For these debates, see especially Wittek, Rise of the Ottoman Empire; Köprülü, Origins of 
the Ottoman Empire; and their reconstructions in Kafadar, Between Two Worlds; Lowry, 
Nature of the early Ottoman state.
111 İnalcik, Ottoman Empire, pp. 13–14.
112 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, p. 140.
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mobilities was determined by “the Ottoman success [to harness] that mobility 
to their own ends while shaping and taming it to conform to their stability-
seeking, centralizing vision”.113
One of the few Ottomanist scholars who have interpreted this more socially 
oriented understanding of Ottoman state formation through the lens of an ex-
plicitly sociological reading is Karen Barkey. Her work provides an ambitious 
endeavor to better understand ‘the longevity of empire’, the longue durée of 
Ottoman political continuities between the fourteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. For the Ottoman fifteenth century, Barkey explained that she actu-
ally built her novel interpretation mostly on the empirical work presented by 
Heath Lowry in his The Nature of the Early Ottoman State. In his analysis of 
Ottoman state building in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Lowry was 
working in a dialogue with many Ottomanists, including Kafadar. Above all, 
Lowry stressed the hybrid nature of the ‘Ottomans’ themselves, and the fact 
that Byzantine and other Christian elites had become active stakeholders in 
Ottoman centripetal forces.114 For Barkey, however, “Lowry’s framework lacks a 
sociological account of how a few men make a revolutionary change in their 
immediate social relations and transform them into relations of power and 
influence”.115 Focusing on these relationships and their transformation, Barkey 
explained that “state transformation then is the resolution of organizational 
and boundary problems realized in the intermediate zone by state actors and 
social actors embedded in networks of negotiations”.116 The state in this con-
text is explicitly defined by Barkey with Weber’s “monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force over a given territory”, to which however she added “Bour-
dieu’s conceptualization of the state, where he talks of ‘symbolic violence over 
a definite territory and the totality of its corresponding population’”.117 Bar-
key’s analysis is further informed by connecting “historical institutionalism 
with network analysis, because the mechanisms of institutional continuity, 
flexibility, and change are embedded in the meso-level network structures that 
link micro-level events and phenomena to macro-social and political 
outcomes”.118 With the assistance of these analytical tools, Barkey explained 
how Ottoman political success is one of flexible and adaptive “brokerage 
across structural holes”, which offered a means for the successful vertical inte-
gration of diverse networks into Ottoman leadership and at the same time the 
113 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, p. 140.
114 Lowry, Nature of the early Ottoman state.
115 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 32.
116 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 17.
117 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 32.
118 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 17.
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horizontal segmentation of these networks so as to maintain Ottoman priority. 
As far as the Ottoman fifteenth century is concerned Barkey argued that this 
integration and segmentation took the shape of “‘institutional layering’, which 
involves attaching new elements onto an otherwise settled institutional 
frame”.119 More particularly, as a consequence of “the layering of Byzantine and 
new Ottoman organizations and practices”,120 Barkey explained her vision on 
fifteenth-century Ottoman state formation as follows:
The empire that was built after 1453 became a robust, flexible, and adap-
tive political entity where a patrimonial center, a strong army, and a de-
pendent and assimilated state elite interconnected with many diverse 
and multilingual populations ensconced in their ecological and territo-
rial niches. The Ottoman imperial order was to be found in the three 
components of empire—legitimacy, control over elites and resources, 
and the maintenance of diversity—each forged through the relations be-
tween state forces and social forces, center and periphery, state and re-
gional elites, and central officials and local populations.121
3.3 Defining Turkmen and Timurid ‘state making’
Timurid and Turkmen political history writing is marked by a similar Weberian 
modelling of co-constitutive relations between state actors and social actors. 
In fact, among the three dynastic research traditions surveyed here, Turkmen 
and Timurid historiography is arguably the field which has most explicitly en-
gaged with this paradigm and with the conceptualization of state formation 
more generally. Hodgson’s qualification of Timurid state formation as a histori-
cal process of state-society polarization offers a case in point. His ‘military pa-
tronage state’ model describes a successful and culturally efflorescent nomad-
urban symbiosis, albeit not a peaceful nor continuous one, operating within an 
immanent institutional framework of absolutist tendencies. This model is not 
just widespread in modern Timurid and Turkmen historiography but as sug-
gested above, it is simultaneously rooted in that historiography’s own centen-
nial lineage. It is moreover the object of empirically informed refinements and 
adjustments by a group of historians who like Hodgson all have some link with 
The University of Chicago and its intellectual legacies. The work and teaching of 
John Woods, professor of Middle Eastern history at The University of Chicago, 
119 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 71.
120 Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 72.
121 Barkey, Empire of Difference, pp. 67–68.
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has been particularly seminal in this respect. In his widely acclaimed The 
Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire, Woods engaged empirically with 
Hodgson’s historical model of the erratic empowerment of an apparatus of 
centralizing power in a volatile context of Turko-Mongol rule and nomad- 
urban symbiosis.122 Importantly, Woods did this by situating his historical 
work in a carefully considered conceptualization of the “Aqquyunlu social and 
political structure”.123 Central to Woods’ understanding of the Aqquyunlu sys-
tem is “the political and institutional separation and accommodation” which 
marked the relationship “between the nomadic military elite (‘Turks’) and the 
urban elite of eastern Anatolia and Iran (‘Tajiks’)”.124 Woods argued that this 
mix of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies manifested itself especially “in 
the structure of both the central and the provincial administration” in the for-
mat of a division of labor and power, and of “interlocking interests of these two 
groups”.125 Identifying this division and interlocking explicitly with the symbi-
otic “a’yan-amir system as defined by Marshall Hodgson”, Woods also echoed 
Hodgson by suggesting that this “proved to be a remarkably effective mecha-
nism for maintaining order and preserving the fabric of society in the absence 
of a powerful central authority”.126 In fact, the latter problem of “absence” is 
equally central to Woods’ understanding of the Aqquyunlu system, as it also 
was for Hodgson more in general. Just like Hodgson, Woods explained this 
struggle for “central authority” as a political pattern that was informed by the 
elite’s nomadism, by Turko-Mongol ideas and ideals of corporative power, and 
by the latter’s creative clashes with the absolutist claims of local administra-
tive traditions and individual military successes.127 The historical process 
which emerged from this pattern was one of regular dynastic turmoil and, as 
122 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 10: “the political, economic, and social evolution of the 
Aqquyunlu confederation from a band of nomadic “cossack” freebooters into a relatively 
centralized, territorial principality based on a regularized but essentially predatory rela-
tionship with agriculture and commerce. … transform the polity into a traditional Irano-
Islamic agrarian empire by gaining physical control of the land and its inhabitants, as well 
as the centers of commercial activity, by reforming administrative practice to extract 
maximum economic advantage, by developing a truly symbiotic relationship with the 
sedentary populations under their rule, and by substituting universalizing Islamic legiti-
mizing principles and institutions for particularistic nomadic ideals, kinship ties, and 
personal loyalties”.
123 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 10–23.
124 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 16.
125 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 19.
126 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 19.
127 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 19–23.
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suggested, erratic empowerment of an apparatus of centralizing power. More 
precisely, Woods concluded, in general, historicizing terms, that
[i]t is precisely the interplay of these two tendencies among the 
Aqquyunlu—the centrifugalism or segmentation associated with clan 
corporateness together with nomadic traditions and the centralizing 
forces characteristic of charismatic, personal, or bureaucratic concepts 
of sovereignty—that constitutes one of the major dynamics in both Prin-
cipality and Empire Periods. Though such systems have been declared 
explosive and ultimately unworkable, it was precisely this volatility—
the continual elimination of entire houses from political contention 
and the consequent renewal of the sovereign mandate in successive 
 dispensations—that helped the system continue to function among the 
Aqquyunlu for almost a century. Viewed in terms of the preceding dis-
cussion, Aqquyunlu dynastic history must therefore be resolved into a 
succession of three dispensations to the houses of Tūr ʿAli, Qara ʿUsman, 
and Uzun Ḥasan.128
These particular centrifugal and centripetal tendencies are explained here as 
not just being an integral part of a state-society dynamic, but simultaneously 
as being internal to Turko-Mongol dispensations such as that of the Aqquyun-
lu. These tendencies re-appear as central building blocks for the highly inspir-
ing analyses that Beatrice Manz has pursued for Timurid political history. In 
her Rise and Rule of Tamerlane she focused almost entirely on this internal dy-
namic to explain Temür’s exceptional political and territorial successes, from 
his rise to power within the Turko-Mongol Chaghatay tribal formation to his 
death as the undisputed leader of “a new imperial dispensation”. For Manz, the 
secret to Temür’s success lay not just in his charismatic personality and his suc-
cessful “rule through people rather than institutions”.129 Above all, his achieve-
ment lay in “the careful division and limitation of power”.130 Manz explained 
how Temür managed to de-center Chaghatay nomadic politics, and to defuse 
the devastating impact of—as Woods had explained—“the centrifugalism or 
segmentation associated with clan corporateness together with nomadic tra-
ditions”, by managing to create an entirely new politico-military elite around 
his person and around the “charismatic, personal, and bureaucratic concepts 
of his sovereignty”. This new elite was composed mainly of his “own family and 
128 Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 22–23.
129 Manz, Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, p. 107.
130 Manz, Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, p. 126.
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his personal followers” with their armies, thus subordinating the existing 
political practices, institutions and elites in and beyond the Ulus Chaghatay 
under an entirely new, trans-regional political order.131 This new political order 
was implemented, fed, and kept under Temür’s control, Manz explained, “by 
undertaking a war of conquest which kept him and his followers out of the 
Ulus Chaghatay almost constantly for the rest of his life”.132
Following this remarkable analysis of how war-making and state-making 
went hand in hand in very particular ways in Temür’s personal politics, Manz 
studied the reign of Temür’s son and successor Shah Rukh from a similar per-
spective in her Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran. In this study, how-
ever, Manz expanded her focus to again more explicitly include the state- 
society relationship that also interested Woods, and Hodgson before him. At 
the same time Manz engaged critically with some of the assumptions that had 
informed this bipolar model. Manz mainly argued that the relative absence of 
war-making during a significant part of Shah Rukh’s reign paradoxically weak-
ened central authority, as this allowed for more autonomous political actors 
and centrifugal tendencies to reemerge with more power. In this context, how-
ever, she explained that any analysis of Timurid politics and state formation 
should acknowledge the fact that “the towns from which the Timurids ruled 
their dominions were like an archipelago within a sea of semi-independent 
regions, over which control was a matter of luck, alliance and an occasional 
punitive expedition”.133 In this diverse and multipolar, rather than uniformly 
bipolar, socio-political context, she claimed that “the division between mili-
tary and civil responsibility and between city and state may have been less 
marked than [Hodgson’s] aʿyān-amīr dichotomy suggests”.134 More specifically, 
power was not the exclusive domain of any one social group or ruler, but was 
“an individual achievement”. Manz concluded that power “was what one per-
son could make out of a variety of affiliations which sometimes went across 
the boundaries between military and civil affairs and between the religious 
and the governmental spheres”.135
131 Manz, Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, p. 88.
132 Manz, Rise and Rule of Tamerlane, p. 89.
133 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 2.
134 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 117–118.
135 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 277. For this diffuse and socially constructed under-
standing of power, Manz explicitly follows Mottahedeh’s ideas about how different types 
of ‘loyalties’ (especially, for Mottahedeh, ‘acquired loyalties’ and ‘loyalties of category’) 
bound people together in power constellations in tenth- and eleventh-century Buyid Iran 
(Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership).
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At the same time, Manz explored the impact of this empowering mix of 
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies which co-existed within the relational 
constructs surrounding individual actors, also framed here as a “multiplicity of 
conflicting allegiances”. She argued that these prevented clear-cut social 
boundaries from establishing themselves and “thus promoted the cohesion of 
society as a whole”.136 Most importantly for the present context, she explained 
how this fluid social nature of power “helped to attach society as a whole to the 
ruling elite”.137 For Manz, this in fact almost means that the state-society di-
chotomy is resolved in favor of an interpretive integration of the state, and of 
“the practice of politics” more generally, in society. Manz therefore reconceptu-
alized “the central government”—the “Timurid state”, here again identified 
with the chancery and financial administration and also, in conflicting ways, 
with military leaderships, dynastic members and their entourages and 
courts.138 She sees that state as “a source of money, employment, status, and 
military power, which might be converted into political capital within one’s 
own region or profession” whereas the usefulness and uses on many levels of 
central government, and even stakeholdership in government “helped to legiti-
mize it and to further its influence”.139 In fact, Manz prioritized these far more 
fluid and co-constitutive conceptions of center and periphery as an alternative 
to the traditional state-society paradigm. They proved useful tools to construct 
more complex and constructive understandings of issues which, as shown 
above, Woods had also identified in a similar (and contemporary Turkmen) 
context as “the absence of powerful central authority”. To this end, Manz again 
‘de-centered’ power, this time not from the clan to the individual chief, as in her 
study of Temür, but, as explained above, from the state or central government 
and the ruler to a multiplicity of individual social actors. At the same time, 
136 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 280.
137 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 280.
138 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, pp. 13–48, 79–110.
139 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 282. There is a less explicitly theorized but related 
paradigm that deserves to be mentioned here. It is considered related here despite the 
fact that to some extent it returned to the state-society binary in the form of Hodgson’s 
‘aʿyān-amīr system’, reformulated as a court/non-court polarity and interpreting the for-
mer with Woods’ dynastic concept of competing ‘dispensations’. This paradigm was fore-
grounded in the reconstruction of a particular set of political stakeholders by Evrim 
Binbaş, in the form of a peer-to-peer network of Perso-Islamic intellectuals organized 
around particular occult knowledge practices who were deeply engaged in early-fifteenth-
century Timurid politics as autonomous transregional agents. Binbaş actually argued that 
as a function of the Timurid state formation process these “informal networks” disap-
peared as political stakeholders and gave way, in the second half of the fifteenth century, 
to “formal Sufi networks” to play a part in Timurid politics (Binbaş, Intellectual Networks 
in Timurid Iran).
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Manz acknowledged the implications of this conceptual shift. Proposing a far 
more minimalist understanding of the Timurid state, she considered it as the 
messy locus of multiple conflicting interests, resources and center-periphery 
relationships. In line with her archipelago metaphor that already suggests very 
vividly what this means for her understanding of the Timurid center, Manz 
advocated a kind of spatial approach to appreciations of Timurid authority 
and regional control, explaining that “Timurid government represented a 
spectrum from relatively direct rule over central regions, under princely gover-
nors, to a hopeful fiction of suzerainty over neighboring confederations”.140
Hodgson’s historical model of the erratic empowerment of an apparatus 
of centralizing power in a volatile context of Turko-Mongol rule and nomad- 
urban symbiosis arguably continues to linger at the background of Manz’ criti-
cal interpretations too. That model is also present in very conscious, yet also 
very different, ways in Maria Subtelny’s Timurids in Transition. Turko-Persian 
Politics and Acculturation in Medieval Iran. Focusing on the reign of the last 
Timurid ruler, Sultan-Husayn Bayqara, Subtelny took an explicitly Weberian 
approach to further conceptualize Hodgson’s notion of the Timurid military 
patronage state141 and, more generally, “the process of transition and state for-
mation under the Timurids”, which she pitched explicitly as “the process of 
transition from a nomadic empire based on a booty economy to a state on 
the sedentary Persian model”.142 Weberian concepts of personal charisma and 
its “routinization”, of the traditional patrimonial household state, and of the 
rational bureaucratic state are Subtelny’s basic tools to analyze this so-called 
process of transition.143 The tension between centrifugal and centripetal 
140 Manz, Power, Politics and Religion, p. 128. See also p. 111: “Timurid control over society radi-
ated outward from a few major cities, and the level of governmental impact varied widely 
from one region to another. We can draw a hierarchy of city and regional control, starting 
with the capital city of Herat, largely dominated by the Timurid court, to the major provin-
cial capitals such as Shiraz and Samarqand, ruled by princely governors heading large 
armies, then to the secondary capitals like Yazd and Kerman, with governors drawn from 
among the lesser princes and the emirs, who often came to identify closely with their re-
gion. Each governor had at his disposal a provincial dīwān and an army of Chaghatay 
soldiers”.
141 See Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, pp. 40–41: “the court of Sulṭān-Ḥusain Bayqara epito-
mized what Marshall Hodgson termed ‘the military patronage state’”.
142 See Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, pp. 39, 41 (amongst others).
143 See Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, p. 2; the “routinization of charisma” is explicitly de-
fined here as a historical process “according to which economic factors served as the chief 
impetus for the reorganization of administrative structures and redefinition of the raison 
d’être of the state”. (p. 15; referring to Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 1121–1123: Chapter 14: 
Charisma and its Transformation; ii. The Genesis and Transformation of Charismatic 
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 tendencies again appears as the driving force behind her understanding of this 
process. However, in contrast to Manz’ multipolar and minimalist approach 
and in an interesting parallel to Woods’ understanding of “the political and in-
stitutional separation and accommodation” between ‘Turks’ and ‘Tajiks’, Sub-
telny interpreted this tension not just in maximalist and almost teleological 
ways, but also in the strictly dichotomous terms of a nomadic-urban polarity, 
which at the same time she framed within that resilient framework of legalistic 
models of the state as follows.
Once set in motion, the process of transition created a dialectic relation-
ship between two basic and opposing tendencies—the one centrifugal, 
represented by the Turko-Mongolian military elite who wanted to pre-
serve the decentralized patrimonial system and values embodied in the 
törä [Timurid custom]; the other centripetal, represented by the propo-
nents of the Persian bureaucratic tradition who sought to establish a bu-
reaucratic state on the Perso-Islamic model in which the Sharīʿa repre-
sented the chief ideological basis for centralization.144
Subtelny argued that this dialectic relationship faltered as “the Timurids would 
ultimately be unsuccessful in effecting […] the routinization of charisma”, and 
the Timurid transition from patrimonial to bureaucratic state never entirely 
materialized.145 Echoing Woods’ suggestion of “the absence of a powerful cen-
tral authority” in the face of dynastic volatility, she suggested that the Timurid 
state, as well as its regional successor states, therefore remained stuck in an 
intermediate stage between so-called Turko-Mongol traditionalism and Perso-
Islamic rationalism, conceptualized here as “a patrimonial-bureaucratic re-
gime at best”.146
Authority; 1. The Routinization of Charisma). More generally, Subtelny referred to the 
 Weberian interpretations that were applied by Thomas Allsen to the thirteenth- and four-
teenth-century Mongol empire and by Stephen Blake to the sixteenth-century Mughal 
empire as the main sources of inspiration for her reading of fifteenth-century Timurid 
political history (pp. 2, 33); in many ways, her work may be understood as an attempt to 
empirically and historically connect the respective patrimonial and patrimonial- 
bureaucratic models that were operationalized by both authors. This ambition to con-
nect Allsen’s and Blake’s models also explains her very particular, historicizing, uses and 
applications of Weber’s three ideal types of legitimate authority. (See Allsen, “Guard and 
Government”; idem, Mongol Imperialism; idem, Culture and Conquest; Blake, “The 
Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals”; idem, “Returning the Household to the 
Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire”).
144 Subtelny, Timurids in Transition, pp. 39–40.
145 Subtelny Timurids in Transition, p. 41.
146 Subtelny Timurids in Transition, pp. 39, 41, 102, 233. See also p. 8: “The resultant Timurid 
polity may thus be characterized as resembling more closely the modified Weberian mod-
el of the patrimonial-bureaucratic regime that combined a patrimonial household/guard 
Jan Dumolyn and Jo Van Steenbergen - 9789004431317
Downloaded from Brill.com06/19/2020 02:28:41PM
via free access
137Studying Rulers & States across 15th Century Western Eurasia
<UN>
3.4 Defining the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate’s ‘state’
Unlike in these fifteenth-century Timurid and Turkmen contexts, and to some 
extent also in Ottoman contexts, most modern historiography of the Syro-
Egyptian Sultanate has never really engaged with any of the more  sociologically 
inspired models that have so far been surveyed here. Whereas, as explained 
above, the writings of Lapidus and Chamberlain have had an invigorating im-
pact in redirecting the fields of Syro-Egyptian social and cultural history, in 
general this has not happened at all in the field of Syro-Egyptian political his-
tory. There, Lapidus’ legalistic statist model of a continuous central bureau-
cratic apparatus that organized protection and exploitation for Syro-Egypt’s 
urban centers and military elites has remained the quiet interpretive norm. 
This tends to be in direct continuity with conceptualizions of the state from 
before Lapidus, without really engaging with Lapidus’ particular framing of 
this bureaucratic state as marginalized by urban society due to a so-called 
“privatization of power”.147 Moreover, Hodgson’s model of the military patron-
age state has arguably not been directly engaged with at all in this fifteenth-
century context. This is somewhat understandable, given the origins of this 
model in Hodgson’s readings into Mongol and post-Mongol history and his 
rather peripheral and therefore also superficial, interest in the Sultanate. What 
is remarkable, however, is the fact that Hodgson’s impression of a very strong 
state-society polarity—as manifested in his somewhat simplifying claim that 
“the great Mamlûk amîrs formed an exclusive oligarchy” and “the civilians of 
Cairo [were] despised and permanently excluded from power”—148 remains 
an unqualified assumption in many, if not most, scholarly engagements with 
the Sultanate’s state, its institutions, practices, norms and actors, and their 
eventful fifteenth-century histories.149
establishment on the political and military level with traditional Persian bureaucratic 
and chancery practices on the administrative level”. For the introduction of this notion of 
a ‘modified model’, see Blake “The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals”.
147 See e.g. Popper’s detailed description of ‘Geography’ and ‘Government’ in Egypt and Syria, 
published in 1955, an example from pre-Lapidus times. See also Igarashi’s development of 
“a new framework in which to understand state and society”, focusing on “the wide-rang-
ing reforms and financial and administrative reorganization that the Mamluk state un-
derwent during the 14th–16th centuries” in Land Tenure, Fiscal Policy and Imperial Power, 
published in 2015, which is an example of ongoing maximalist assumptions of a bureau-
cratic state.
148 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam. Volume 2, pp. 418, 419.
149 See e.g. Elbendary’s interesting argument “for a more nuanced and comprehensive narra-
tive of Mamluk state and society in late medieval Egypt and Syria”. She pitches “Mamluk 
subjects” and “Mamluk rulers” against each other in contexts of socio-economic stress, 
and interprets this in a kind of one-dimensional parallel to Lapidus’ notion of a privatiza-
tion of power, as moments of political empowerment for the former and of administra-
tive “dysfunction” and “decentralization” for the latter (Elbendary, Crowds and Sultans).
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Nevertheless, there are a handful of recent empirical insights that are worth 
referring to here briefly as promising avenues for further, more sociologically 
informed, reflection. This overview comes with the caveat that, conceptually, 
most of these studies equally continued, and continue, to situate themselves 
rather vaguely within the legalistic tradition’s structural models of absolutist 
bureaucratic power. These recent insights mostly involve the remarkable cen-
tralizing empowerment of the sultan’s household in the fifteenth century 
which scholars have seen as a function of its growing socio-economic weight, 
impact and autonomy and of the changing nature of its agents and their rela-
tionships. This approach is present in a survey chapter by Jean-Claude Garcin 
and also especially in detailed studies by Julien Loiseau and Francisco Apel-
lániz.150 In Reconstruire la maison du sultan Loiseau has an interesting (albeit 
mainly empirical) way of describing the rise to prominence in the first half of 
this century of royal household officials and families of administrators 
(“l’avènement des grands commis civils”). Here he demonstrated how these 
officials appeared as increasingly autonomous royal household agents and, 
eventually, bureaucratic leaders, empowered by their success in expanding 
royal income and investments, ultimately becoming active stakeholders in “a 
new Mamluk order (‘un nouvel ordre mamelouk’)”.151 Apellániz engaged with a 
similar model of fifteenth-century central socio-economic transformation. In 
his monograph Pouvoir et finance en Méditerranée pré-moderne he focused in 
particular on the “commercialization” of the Sultanate’s political economy, 
with another set of new royal agents and partners (including the Venetians) 
tapping into new sources of royal income and simultaneously opening up new 
avenues of political power along parallel old (military) and new (commercial) 
structures. However, in analyzing this kind of ‘layering of organizations and 
practices’ (as the aforementioned Ottomanist Barkey termed this phenome-
non of parallel structures in the Ottoman context), Apellániz argued that 
150 See Garcin, “Regime of the Circassian Mamlūks”; Loiseau, Reconstruire la maison du sul-
tan; Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Pouvoir et finance en méditerranée pré-moderne.
151 Loiseau, Reconstruire la maison du sultan, vol. 1, pp. 179–214 (“Chapitre 4: Refondation de 
l’état, redistribution du pouvoir: vers un nouvel ordre mamelouk”); expanded in Loiseau, 
Les Mamelouks, pp. 101–105. These powerful administrators also figure prominently in Iga-
rashi, “Office of the Ustādār al-ʿĀliya”; Martel-Thoumian, Les civils et l’administration; 
Petry, The Civilian Elite of Cairo; Miura, “Administrative Networks in the Mamlūk Period”. 
The related theme of (de-)centralization returns in the writings of Yossef Rapoport and 
Robert Irwin who explain changes in the administration of justice in similar terms of the 
expansion of state power (Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law”; see also Stilt, Is-
lamic Law in Action) or of its exact opposite, as privatization (Irwin, “Privatization of ‘Jus-
tice’”; see also Meloy, “Privatization of Protection”).
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these generated opposite, decentralizing tendencies towards the end of the 
century.152
Here we see at least an allusion to the challenging analytical horizons of the 
fifteenth-century Syro-Egyptian process of state formation, from the manifes-
tation of deep socio-economic transformations and a widening political par-
ticipation to the formation of a new political order and its construction out of 
variously interacting centripetal and centrifugal tendencies.
The most explicit theorization of these developments is arguably to be 
found in a joint publication by Van Steenbergen, Wing and D’hulster. “The 
Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate? State Formation and the History of 
Fifteenth Century Egypt and Syria” presents an argument for modelling these 
different analytical horizons as “the growth of the state, both as a non-dynastic 
idea of hegemonic political order and as a coercive bureaucratic apparatus 
that was produced by, and that was set up to reproduce that order”.153 This 
conceptualization was inspired by Ibn Khaldun’s notion of the sedentarization 
of nomad power and by Pierre Bourdieu’s model of transformation “from the 
king’s house to the reason of state”. It sees the changing loci of central power in 
the fifteenth century as the manifestation of a radical social transformation. 
This again involved the above-mentioned idea of ‘layering’, but now in a social 
rather than institutional way. The range of empowering relationships was ex-
panded during this period from personal service being given to individuals or 
households to specialized service being offered to the sultan’s court in Cairo, 
and to its agents and local offshoots, and their diverse interests. Further, “The 
Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate?” suggested that this social layering 
was “part of a broader development in which the messy paths to power and 
influence, to a share in the central state’s political system, became ever more 
meritocratic and bureaucratized”. The paper also claimed that this involved, 
almost by default, the performative imagination of that central state in in-
creasingly meritocratic, non-dynastic, and ‘Mamluk’ terms.154
In many ways, this theorization of fifteenth-century Syro-Egyptian social 
transformation (and its ‘Mamlukization’, as a form of ‘meritocratization’) 
152 Apellániz, Pouvoir et finance en méditerranée pré-moderne. This kind of ‘layering’, or of a 
parallelism of political structures, was also used as an interpretive framework by Petry, 
Protectors or Praetorians?, even though in that context it was rather more negatively rep-
resented as a juxtaposition of institutional conservatism and clandestine pragmatism, 
and defined as “overt institutional inertia” and “covert practical innovation”.
153 Van Steenbergen, Wing & D’hulster, “Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate?-ii”, p. 561.
154 Van Steenbergen, Wing & D’hulster, “Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate?-ii”, 
pp. 565–566, quote p. 565.
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builds on various scholars’ re-interpretations of thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century Syro-Egyptian state formation through the lens of elite households, 
dynastic practices and Hodgson’s model of the military patronage state.155 Van 
Steenbergen also elaborated on the issue in two more generalizing theoretical 
essays which complement each other in their respective diachronic and spa-
tial approaches to the theoretical problem of Syro-Egyptian state formation 
under the Cairo sultans between the thirteenth and early sixteenth centuries. 
“Appearances of Dawla and Political Order in late medieval Syro-Egypt” makes 
an explicit attempt to connect with the cultural turn in state studies, and with 
Chamberlain’s prioritization of social practice. This essay also pays particular 
attention to Mitchell’s above-mentioned Foucauldian understanding of the 
state as a structural appearance and “as the powerful, metaphysical effect of 
practices that make [actual] structures appear to exist”.156 Following Cham-
berlain, “Appearances of Dawla” proposes a useful way out of the longstanding 
state-society predicament and the legalistic structuralism that it implied by 
advocating for an analytical turn towards social practice. It is suggested that 
priority should be given to exploring practices of reproduction, integration 
and segmentation among Syro-Egyptian power elites, and that, as Mitchell 
suggested, this should be coupled with an interpretation of representations of 
statist institutions, practices and discourses as both structural and structuring 
effects of what these elites did. This is then suggested to imply that we should 
accept as an entry point for any historical analysis and interpretation the messy 
micro-historical diversity of elitist actors and agencies in which these practical 
arrangements of reproduction, integration and segmentation and their effects 
continued to manifest themselves. On this basis, “Appearances of Dawla” 
claimed that scholars ought to approach the long history of the Sultanate as a 
discontinuous one, in which a preponderance of state-making over the messi-
ness of war-making happened only “in contexts of successful, relatively long 
and charismatic authority”. In the long fifteenth century, these contexts are sug-
gested here to have emerged especially during the reigns of the sultans Barsbay 
and Jaqmaq in the 1430s and 40s, of Qaytbay in the 1470s and 80s, and of Qan-
sawh in the 1500s.157 “An alternative model for understanding late medieval 
155 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social Practice. See also Loiseau, Les Mamelouks, pp. 111–124; 
Bauden, “The Sons of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad”; Koby, “Mamluks and their Relatives”; Ey-
chenne, Liens personnels, clientélisme et réseaux de pouvoir; Flinterman & Van Steenber-
gen, “Al-Nasir Muhammad and the Formation of the Qalawunid State”; Van Steenbergen, 
“The Mamluk Sultanate as a Military Patronage State”.
156 Mitchell, “Limits of the State”, p. 94.
157 Van Steenbergen, “Appearances of Dawla”, esp. p. 77; see also Van Steenbergen, “‘Mamluki-
sation’ between social theory and social practice”, esp. p. 33.
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Syro-Egyptian political organisation that emerges from all this”, this essay con-
cludes more generally,
is then one of sultanic political order—the state—as process, in constant 
flux as the structural effect and structuring embodiment of constantly 
changing practices of social reproduction, elite integration and political 
distinction, in contexts that range between multipolar and unipolar so-
cial organisation at and around Cairo’s court and its military elites.158
Furthermore, in the essay “Revisiting the Mamlūk Empire. Political Action, Re-
lationships of Power, Entangled Networks, and the Sultanate of Cairo in late 
medieval Syro-Egypt”, a transregional and at the same time socially  constructed 
center-periphery dimension is added to the diachronic model of Syro- Egyptian 
state formation that was formulated in “Appearances of Dawla”. Taking inspira-
tion from, amongst others, Barkey’s aforementioned rethinking of the ques-
tion of Ottoman longevity, “Revisiting the Mamlūk Empire” suggests thinking 
of Syro-Egyptian power groups and their patrimonial leaders as different bun-
dles “of diverse but entangled networks, that appear to operate—or present 
themselves as operating—on a trans-local canvas of connectivity”. However, 
these networks were “always constructed in the micro-history of people and 
their negotiation of particular cultural, socio-economic and political relation-
ships”. As a result, these relationships did not just connect central and periph-
eral elites (as Barkey suggested for the Ottoman case). They also actually 
constituted different groups, or entangled networks, as such central and pe-
ripheral elites, in continuously disputed and reconfigured ways. Furthermore, 
these particular sets of centering relationships always appeared as “permeable 
and as crisscrossed by many other, equally fluid, relational realities that seemed 
to be pulsating from other local or trans-local centers of social, economic, cul-
tural or even political action”.159
4 Concluding Observations: West-Asian and Eurasian Parallels, 
Connections and Divergences?
The modelling of the state in fifteenth-century Syro-Egypt as one among a ‘lay-
ered’ variety of fluid, permeable and competitive social processes of power, 
158 Van Steenbergen, “Appearances of Dawla”, p. 78; see also Van Steenbergen, “‘Mamlukisa-
tion’ between social theory and social practice”, p. 34.
159 Van Steenbergen, “Revisiting the Mamlūk Empire”.
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mainly marked out from other processes by its irregular growth and consti-
tutive political effects, certainly connects in multiple ways with some of the 
Ottoman, Turkmen and Timurid models presented here. It appeals to the view 
of Ottomanists such as Kafadar and, especially, Barkey who tried to reconceive 
of the Ottoman state formation process of the fifteenth century with new, or 
at least more explicitly defined, analytical tools, turning to social relations and 
networks, center-periphery dynamics, and institutional layering. It also demon-
strates interesting parallels with Woods’ suggestion of Turkmen discontinuity 
in the regular “renewal of the sovereign mandate in successive dispensations”. 
It connects even more, in complementary ways, with Manz’ understanding of 
“the practice of politics” in Timurid history, not least with her ‘de- centering’ 
of that history and its more minimalist modelling along her archipelago 
metaphor. At the same time, however, this Syro-Egyptian model perhaps of-
fers an additional way of integrating these particular Ottoman, Turkmen and 
Timurid models in more entangled, trans-dynastic and West-Asian historical 
considerations, not just by imagining resource accumulation, war-making 
and  state-making from the perspective of particular, West-Asian practices of 
reproduction, integration and segmentation, but also by interpreting their ef-
fects as a socially rather than a merely geographically constituted process of 
‘centering’ power around various Turko-Mongol elites across fifteenth-century 
Islamic West-Asia. In other words, this Syro-Egyptian model makes a more ex-
plicit call for an interpretive turn to consider shared power practices and to 
identify more clearly which factors distinguished these shared practices from 
each other. It invites researchers to consider how the appearance of local co-
herence and regional difference in the format of Ottoman, Turkmen, Timurid 
and ‘Mamluk’ states was the contingent outcome of practical arrangements 
continuously (and often also violently) negotiated between various and multi-
valent groups of in- and outsiders, acting along local, regional or transregional 
stakes in different parallel, overlapping and intersecting social processes.
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter the aim here was not just to 
describe the many winding roads of the study of political organization and 
state formation across fifteenth-century West-Asia and Western Eurasia. In ad-
dition to this theoretical contextualization of the present volume and its con-
tributions, this chapter also sought to lay a heuristic ground for meaningful 
comparison, and for better understanding the parallels, connections and di-
vergences of approaches to fifteenth-century statist appearances in modern 
scholarship. The rather different research trajectories and interpretive con-
texts described here certainly offer much food for thought. Some connections 
and parallels can easily be drawn, even beyond the rather clear-cut epistemo-
logical boundaries that separate West-Asian and European research traditions. 
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First and foremost, there are the diverse impacts of the trajectories of twenti-
eth century social theory. This goes up to postmodern renewed interests in the 
state, but above all relates to the Weberian paradigm, which regularly re-
emerges in more or less subtle ways, and in more or less critically informed 
contexts. More generally, there are the legalistic or sociological traditions, 
structural or practical perspectives, and maximalist or minimalist interpreta-
tions that appear everywhere as more or less consciously constructed points of 
conceptual departure and debate. These shared points furthermore include 
variables such as the state/society polarity, the centrifugal/centripetal dynam-
ic, and the war-making/state-making symbiosis that regularly appear as ex-
planatory tools in a variety of guises. Finally, another parallel emerges through 
a more particular fifteenth-century Western Eurasian moment of state forma-
tion, variously framed as bureaucratization, routinization, imperial formation, 
an increase in the distribution of statist labor, a lengthening of the chains of 
authority and agency, an expansion in the ranks of statist stakeholders, or sim-
ply as state growth. This obviously represents another parallel within the dif-
ferent research traditions, even though perhaps it appears as such more on an 
empirical than on any shared interpretive level.
As suggested by the latter observation of interpretive dissonance in a more 
specific context of fifteenth-century state formation, it must also be acknowl-
edged that these connections and parallels only appear to exist in their most 
generalizing formulations when their specific uses are abstracted, even within 
the different West-Asian and European research traditions. Above all it is clear 
that as far as fifteenth-century state formation is concerned, not much inter-
pretive interaction nor integration of analytical solutions has happened be-
yond the East-West divide. Even within each tradition, especially the West-
Asian tradition, across the diverse political landscapes there are still very few 
theoretically-informed dialogues. The study of the state in fifteenth-century 
Western Eurasia thus appears itself as a very ‘layered’ and ‘de-centered’ phe-
nomenon, in institutional as well as practical terms. This is obviously a func-
tion of the particular historical trajectories followed by these historiographical 
traditions of state studies, determined amongst others by the different empiri-
cal realities, the different sets of research skills, and the different relations with 
the modern world that mark each tradition. At the same time, this lack of dia-
logue remains surprising, especially given that there are many parallels which 
at least on a more general level appear to connect rather than to separate, and 
which could offer many opportunities for fruitful interpretive exchanges.
Research has thus been conducted on the fifteenth-century state in di-
verging ways, not just for Europe and Islamic West-Asia in general, but also 
for many of the different dynastic and proto-nationalist constituents of each 
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region. That divergence, however, also harbors many opportunities for an en-
riching exchange of ideas. As argued earlier in this chapter, any study of states 
and of their impact on human history should internalize the assumption that 
all statist manifestations are specific. For this reason, they can only be consid-
ered as contextually defined exceptions of any ideal type that may be employed 
for analysis. Rather than trying to reduce that specificity and exceptionality to, 
prioritize it within, or exclude it from a statist ideal, the priority in compara-
tive research, and, for that matter also in non-comparative historical research, 
should be to use that ideal to acknowledge for, and to decipher, specificity and 
exceptionality. Searching for shared conceptual tools to enhance the compara-
tive potential of the Eurasian canvas of empirical historical research as pre-
sented in this volume is therefore not just about finding parallels and connec-
tions, but rather more about identifying divergence from a shared model.
As explained before, Walter Scheidel regarded Tilly’s “model of state forma-
tion driven by interstate and class conflict” and by the interplay of war-making 
and state-making as holding the most promise for comparative research.160 At 
the end of this chapter, we want to suggest that future work should integrate 
Tilly’s into a more practical model. This should also be informed by Mitchell’s 
suggestion that states do not make history, but that history makes states, as and 
when successful social practices of exclusion, integration, reproduction and 
appropriation start appearing, and presenting themselves, as pertaining to a 
coherent apparatus of coercion, distinction, differentiation and hegemony. 
This approach certainly resonates with the particular model of social practices 
of reproduction, integration and segmentation and their performative center-
ing effects that appeared to connect at least some of the West-Asian model-
lings reviewed above. Considered together, in a socially de-centered and lay-
ered way, as what made states appear across fifteenth-century Western Eurasia, 
these practices and their effects may well represent a useful touchstone to help 
identify specificity and exceptionality in the many processes of state formation 
that defined fifteenth-century Western Eurasia.
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